THE ASSEMBLY´S MEETING WITH WEU/PSC AMBASSADORS:
FOCUS ON SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

Paris, 3 April 2007 - Joint meeting of Assembly members with the WEU Permanent Council and the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), chaired by Senator Jean-Pierre MASSERET (France, Socialist Group), President of the Assembly, took place on 29 March at the Egmont Palace (Brussels). The German Ambassador Clemens VON GOETZE, representing the current WEU/EU presidency, indicated that Germany was working towards bringing a new EU treaty into force before the 2009 European elections.
Ambassador VON GOETZE stressed that there had been a dramatic increase in cooperation over the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Foreign Affairs Ministers were meeting once a month and PSC Ambassadors two full days a week. He reviewed EU operations and progress in developing military and civilian capabilities. A possible direction in future might be for the EU to undertake increasingly actions in support of other international organisations, such as the UN.
Ambassador VON GOETZE acknowledged that rapid reaction forces could not be deployed without approval by parliament. It was therefore important to brief national parliamentarians on the political and military stakes of EU operations well before they were launched.
Many Assembly members felt that South-East Europe should be the EU´s priority area for action. They expressed particular concern over the situation in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the difficulties encountered in reforming the police and ensuring its multi-ethnicity reflect the difficulties of reforming the whole political system in Bosnia. In Kosovo, the political climate permitting, the EU would be ready to take over from the United Nations mission (UNMIK) and launch a major civilian operation in the field of justice and police (with an “advisory” role as well as an “executive” one), to be run in parallel with the NATO military operation (KFOR) which should be maintained. The EU also plans to launch a police operation in Afghanistan in June, in close cooperation with the NATO military operation (ISAF).
Lieutenant-General David LEAKEY (UK), Director General of the EU Military Staff, spoke of the EU Council Decision, taken in February, to reduce the number of troops stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the Althea military operation launched by the EU in 2004 (from 6 000 to 2 500). He stressed the reversibility of this process should the need arise.
General LEAKEY welcomed the success of the recent EU military operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR RD CONGO). This operation, which was conducted completely independently and in support of United Nations forces, contributed to maintaining order during the elections. He nevertheless stressed the difficulty of rapidly deploying a “multinational” force for a “temporary” period of a few weeks. He found the Battlegroups concept a good one. However, the command chain still needed to be proved and troops required joint training. In Darfur (Sudan), for example, it might be possible to deploy a Battlegroup to provide better transition between the African Union Mission (AMIS) and that of the United Nations.
Mr Roland ZINZIUS, Deputy Director of the Civ/Mil Cell of the EU Council, considered that the EU´s comprehensive “civilian/military” approach to crisis management was an invaluable
tool for Europe. The Civ/Mil Cell, consisting of some 30 people, including 2 Commission officials, was the first standing EU body to fully integrate military and civilian expertise. The Cell had significantly contributed to the preparation of EU missions in Aceh (Indonesia), in Rafah/Gaza and in Darfur in support of AMIS. At present, it was fully involved in planning the envisaged civilian ESDP operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Mr Zinzius stressed the problem of the lack of civilian specialists (police officers, magistrates, experts) available for six to nine months to ensure such missions.
The Cell was also responsible for generating the capacity to plan and conduct an autonomous EU military operation once a decision on such an operation has been taken. As regards the command chain, at the level of the Operations Headquarters, the EU had three options in practice. It could use NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus arrangements (EU/NATO), as in the case of operation Althea. It could also draw on one of the national Operations Headquarters designated by five member states (Germany, Spain, France, Greece, the United Kingdom), as was the case for EUFOR RD CONGO where the German OHQ in Potsdam was selected. The Operations Centre, which was not a standing Headquarters, could be activated by drawing on pre-identified equipment and human resources (89 people in total), so as to be able to plan (within 5 days) and to conduct (within 20 days) an operation on the scale of Artemis (around 2 000 troops). According to Mr ZINZIUS, the Centre would offer two advantages: 1) first, its proximity to the Council and Commission decision-making bodies and structures, and 2) second, the fact that its configuration could be tailored to forms of EU action in-theatre which increasingly had a civilian and military dimension. The Operations Centre would be activated for the first time in June 2007 for the military exercise MILEX 07/CPX.
According to Senator Jean-Pierre MASSERET (France, Socialist Group), President of the Assembly, “whatever planning capabilities you have, you need political agreement before using them. Experience shows that member states are reluctant to become involved in an informal advanced planning process for fear of then having to take the lead in and the burden of the planned operation. More than ever the development of ESDP depends on the political will of all EU member states to participate unreservedly!”