DOCUMENT A/1880

1 December 2004

---

The European Union and peacekeeping in Africa

---

Document A/1880

1 December 2004

The European Union and peacekeeping in Africa

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee²
by Mr Goris, Rapporteur (Belgium, Liberal Group)

________

¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 9 November 2004.

² Members of the Committee: Mr Wilkinson (Chairman); MM McNamara, Goris (Vice-Chairmen), Mrs Aguiar, MM Blanco García (Alternate: Cosidó Gutiérrez), Lord Burlison, MM Cortes Muños, Cox, Dell'Utri, Dreyfus-Schmidt, Duivesteijn, Fernández Aguilar, Freiherr v. Guttenberg KT, Glesener, Goulet, Gubert, Henry, Jacquat, Jardim, Jonas, Mrs Jonker, MM Leibrecht, Lengagne, Medeiros Ferreira, Monfils, Nikolopoulos, de Puig, Ranieri, Rigoni, Rivolta (Alternate: Nessa), Schneider, Siebert, Varvitsiotis, Mrs Veenendaal, MM Vrettos, Walter, Mrs Wegener.

Affiliate members: MM Aarna, Brocka, Hegyi, Mrs Herczog, MM Ibl, Janas, Jelinçic, Komorowski, Lorenz, Matulevicius, Neças, Surjan, Turlais, Wrzodak (Alternate: Lusnia), N ...

Associate members: Mr Açikgöz, Mrs Bilgehan, MM Çavusoglu, Hjörleifsson, Mrs Nybakk, Mr Tekelioglu.

Affiliate associate members: Mrs Andreeva, MM Gaucan, Pop, Szabó, N...

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

---

RECOMMENDATION 756¹

(i) Stressing historical, cultural and economic ties between the states of sub-Saharan Africa and many European nations, and the European Union;

(ii) Preoccupied by the absence of a lasting solution to problems of instability and the conflicts endured by many African states, particularly Côte d'Ivoire, the Darfur region in Sudan and the Great Lakes Region (Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda) and expressing its concern at the deteriorating political and economic situation in Zimbabwe;

(iii) Considering that the situation as regards peace and security remains highly unstable throughout Africa, due to the persistence of flash-points for armed conflict, large numbers of refugees and displaced persons and the difficulties standing in the way of the continent's economic and social development which is being held back partly as a result of the damaging consequences of the AIDS pandemic;

(iv) Considering that it is the responsibility first and foremost of African states themselves to resolve their quarrels and internal differences according to whatever principles and methods they regard as most appropriate and having due respect for international and international humanitarian law;

(v) Pointing to the African Union's increasing involvement in resolving conflicts in Africa, usually by peaceful means and by consensus;

(vi) Supporting the efforts being made by the African Union to develop its conflict resolution and crisis-management capabilities;

(vii) Considering that this process can be carried out quickly and satisfactorily only by stepping up bilateral and multilateral cooperation over crisis management between African countries and the European countries concerned, and between the EU and the AU;

(viii) Considering that the EU, with its special relationship with sub-Saharan Africa, should implement a coherent and coordinated multi-dimensional peace and security policy for Africa, in cooperation with the United Nations, NATO and other organisations and countries concerned;

(ix) Taking the view that the institutions responsible for the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy should have a subsidiary role in coordinating bilateral and multilateral initiatives to support African military crisis-management capabilities;

(x) Considering that the EU also has a particular responsibility to provide economic assistance towards the development of sub-Saharan Africa, in particular by means of fair trade and cooperation agreements and by opening up its markets to African products, all of which would make a major contribution towards stability;

(xi) Expressing its support for European troops currently being deployed as part of stabilisation, buffer or peacekeeping forces in Africa,

1. Encourage WEU nations to provide support to African countries' military crisis-management capability through education and training and technical assistance (equipment and logistics) programmes;
2. Improve coordination between the security and defence support programmes currently linking some WEU nations with countries in Africa;
3. Ensure that WEU nations have the necessary operational capabilities to intervene rapidly, if necessary, in any crises affecting regional and international peace and security and in particular when human rights are infringed;
4. Encourage the European Union to increase cooperation with the African Union in the area of civil and military crisis management;
5. Keep the Assembly informed of initiatives taken by WEU nations towards peace and security in Africa.

---

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. The first autonomous peacekeeping operation led by the European Union in Africa, codenamed "Artemis", was launched on 12 June 2003 in the north-eastern Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In accordance with the mandate set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003, an interim emergency multinational force was deployed to the town of Bunia to work in close cooperation with the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). Artemis' primary goal was to put a stop to the killing and plundering by armed militia in Bunia, to protect the population and the refugees and to secure the city and its airport so as to provide a secure base for MONUC.
2. At its peak, Operation Artemis involved the deployment of a total of 2060 personnel² from 18 countries, 12 of them EU member states. By the end of its mandate, on 1 September 2003, the operation was hailed a success, having succeeded in restoring security in the region and helping displaced persons return to their homes. Following the operation, the population in Bunia had increased from 40 000 to 100 000³ people, markets were reopened and a reinforced MONUC contingent was deployed.
3. A large number of European national and multinational peacekeeping operations have taken place in Africa since the early 1990s. The chronic instability and conflicts which have afflicted many regions and states on the continent justify the intervention of the international community and the various types of aid it has provided ranging from political and economic assistance to military crisis management and humanitarian aid⁴. In 2004, of the 53 countries of sub-Saharan Africa at least 20 are affected by armed conflicts or are going through a period of political and economic instability.
4. European countries often acknowledge that one of the main causes of the complex African problems that exist today is the continent's past and the events which have marked its history. Many of these problems can be attributed to colonialism and, more importantly, to the decolonialism of the 1960s. For many African states independence did not necessarily lead to greater freedom. On the contrary, it left them almost overnight in a situation where they had to fend for themselves, and with regimes with no real experience of handling the complex events which subsequently unfolded. In addition, many African nations had to contend with a series of different problems within their borders, that gave rise to immigration and, as a result, the spread of cross-border tensions which have plagued the continent for the past four decades.
5. One of the most recent and shocking developments is the humanitarian and human rights crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan, with up to 600 000 people affected at end 2003⁵ and as many as a million to date. The crisis prompted the UN Security Council in July 2004 to adopt Resolution 1556 calling on the Sudanese Government to disarm the Janjaweed militias, responsible for the violence⁶. Tensions also remain high in the Democratic Republic of Congo where, despite extensive peace negotiations, numerous armed militia groups are in control of the country and inter-ethnic massacres are still taking place. In Liberia, despite the signing of a peace agreement in early 2003, the country remains divided in two by a security zone and the political situation is still volatile.
6. In addition to political clashes, violence by rebel movements and cross-border fighting, very large sections of the continent are plagued by other dire problems which will have serious repercussions in the short and medium term: a spreading AIDS epidemic (UN estimates report that between 25 million and 28.2 million Africans today carry the HIV virus), poverty and deteriorating health and environmental conditions. As a result the number of victims, refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and asylum seekers soared throughout the 1990s. The UN Refugee Agency UNHCR's estimates for 2003 placed the African continent second after Asia on its list of populations in danger, with a total of 4.6 million people affected⁷. In 2002, of the 10 countries of the world with major refugee populations six were African states. Child soldier recruits have been used in every African nation involved in conflict since 1994 and a surge in recruitment was reported in DRC, the Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia in 2003.
7. The number of victims on the sub-Saharan continent as a result of armed conflicts over the past 10 years. is even more tragic. In Angola, Congo, Rwanda and Sudan over 800 000 deaths have been reported for each country, whilst in many other countries, from Senegal, Sierra Leone and Liberia in the west across to Eritrea and Somalia to the east, the numbers of deaths reported are in the tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. The outlook for these nations is at present grim to say the least. A combination of corrupt governments, chaotic rule and critically deteriorating - in some cases practically non-existent economies - add to the problems, creating an urgent need for foreign aid and intervention on the part of the international community.
8. Another factor to be taken into consideration and which is on the increase is that of terrorism on the African continent. With a number of volatile regions turning into ideal breeding grounds for terrorist groups and activities, Africa is a continent that is in dire need of urgent international aid if the situation, as it spirals out of control, is not to be exploited by terrorist groups seeking to extend their activities. Counter-terrorism operations -such as the US led Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) - have been conducted on the continent since the late 1990s in order to combat terrorism.

9. After the second world war the relationship between Europe and Africa began to change. Major European colonising states such as Britain and France entered a period of decolonisation which was to alter their hold and influence over the African continent. Most colonies won independence in the late 1950s and the 1960s during the cold war. To counter the Soviet influence and preserve the economic benefits they enjoyed, Western countries and the United States provided some African states, which were somewhat sceptical about their intentions, with economic and military assistance. But this relatively peaceful period in which some progress was made was not devoid of internal or inter-state conflicts. During the mid-1970s, after Portuguese decolonisation, Soviet influence was extended to Africa and mainly to Angola and Mozambique. Without thinking about the consequences their action might have, the Western countries retaliated by strengthening their support for any African government or guerrilla movement fighting communism.
10. Problems which had been neglected such as tense inter-ethnic relations, economic and demographic imbalances and quarrels over resources and frontiers burst into the open after the fall of communism. Through the media, the world watched pictures of poverty, famine and conflicts which increased the pressure upon the international community to act. Europe began to change its approach and cooperation with African states was stepped up; more aid was provided, numerous agreements were concluded and new forms of cooperation were established to focus on the continent and its problems. In this age of globalisation, what happens in Africa has repercussions which transcend borders: increases in illegal immigration, terrorism and economic destabilisation threaten to spread from the troubled regions of Africa to the borders of the EU.
11. The Assembly of WEU's contribution on the African dimension of Europe's security should also be mentioned. The Assembly has kept a watching brief on the situation in Africa from as far back as 1960 with an initial report, "Which Europe? Which Africa?⁸" followed up in 1961 by "Which Europe? Which Africa? - Repercussions on Africa of the development of European unity". In the years between 1990 and 1999, the Assembly covered conflicts and crises in Africa, in particular the genocide in Rwanda in 1994⁹, constantly repeating its call for an increased European commitment to crisis management and peacekeeping on that continent.
12. In September 1998, the Assembly held a colloquy in Lisbon on "Peacekeeping and security in Africa". This served as the basis for a report and recommendation which were submitted and adopted at the June 1999 session. Recommendation 645¹⁰, adopted on 15 June 1999, can with justification be regarded as visionary, in as much as the Assembly's demands of the WEU Council correspond virtually word for word to the precepts that now govern European Union policy towards Africa in peace and security matters. Given that they are still fully relevant today, it is worth setting them out in detail below:

1. The European Security Strategy and Africa

13. Africa, and specifically sub-Saharan Africa, is described as one of the major global challenges in the European Security Strategy. Particular emphasis and concern are placed on a number of problems plaguing the continent since the early 1990s. These include the AIDS pandemic, poverty, political instability and violent conflict leading to the destruction of infrastructure, increased criminality and the inability of economies to function.
14. In the framework of the EU-Africa dialogue, discussions focus mainly on the following key issues: (i) peace and security issues; (ii) governance; (iii) regional integration and trade; (iv) key development issues - including, debt, food security and HIV/AIDS; (v) effective multilateralism¹¹. This recent regrouping falls under the EU's priority of enhancing the effectiveness of the dialogue between the Union and Africa.

a) Africa's importance to the European Union

15. There are numerous reasons why Africa is important to the EU and why stability on the continent is crucial. Their nature is primarily economic; however, they also fall under the scope of security. Africa is an important trading partner for the European Union with promising prospects of greater trade. Imports from Africa reached 76 billion dollars in 2002 and exports amounted to 66 billion dollars, whilst between 1995 and 2002 trade rates fell by 0.1% and 0.2% respectively¹². Although not one of Europe's key trading partners, Africa is rich in land resources and raw materials whose commercial exploitation has to some extent been hit by the unstable environment in many African states.
16. There is also a sense of tradition and history in connection with the African continent, thereby increasing the importance of preserving its relations with the European Union. Significant European communities were established in numerous states in the past. Today there exist sizeable European communities in many African countries such as Congo, Ghana, Senegal and Angola whilst smaller communities remain in Niger, Uganda, Burundi and Gabon amongst others. Their ties help maintain a link between the two continents which goes beyond the economic sphere, it is a human link which provides for the exchange of know-how and information between societies and cultures.

b) Threats to European security

17. Regarding threats to the future of European security, it is a fact that the current explosive situation in many African states provides a breeding ground for terrorism and extremism. Without good governance, without adequate security forces or intelligence, extremist groups and factions are free to create and expand their networks and develop into terrorist cells. One such example is the al-Qa'ida attack in Mombasa, Kenya, in November 2002, which claimed 13 lives, whilst there is concern that numerous al-Qa'ida cells may be developing or operating in "troubled" African states.
18. Another issue which causes concern is illegal immigration. As people flee from their troubled regions in search of better conditions in Europe, two distinct negative after-effects are automatically created. Firstly, all illegal immigration transfers problems from one region to another, without solving them. Secondly, and perhaps even more important, is the rise in far-right political formations in Europe, directly related to the effects of illegal immigration upon local communities.

2. Prevention and assistance

19. The EU has, over the years, strived to increase and develop its support in the African continent to address a wide range of issues. The Union's actions vary, from peacekeeping operations to economic aid to the development of relations and cooperation with regional organisations. The primary steps towards turning ideas into actions are implemented through country and regional strategy papers which outline the problems and the objectives for each specific region. In addition, the EU has also been steadily developing its relations with local organisations such as the African Union (AU) and the Africa Caribbean Pacific group (ACP). Crucial agreements have been reached through talks and cooperation which combine the expertise of the local organisations and the much-needed financial backing of the Union.

(a) Cooperation with the African Union and division of responsibilities

20. In the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa on 23 May 1963, 32 African states set up the Organisation for African Unity with the aim of helping bring about unity and development on the African continent. This paved the way for settlement of conflicts in Africa by Africans themselves. However, the limits of the powers of its Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA), which are confined to the settlement of interstate conflict, while most crises in Africa tend to be of an internal nature (sometimes with external ramifications), soon became apparent.
21. The African Heads of State, "... conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda (...)¹³" on 9 September 1999, at Libya's initiative, adopted the Declaration of Sirte which affirms the decision to "... establish an African Union, in conformity with the ultimate objectives of the Charter of our continental Organisation and the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community". The OAU's Lomé Summit (10-12 July 2000) adopted the Constitutive Act of African Union which took effect at the Durban Summit (8-10 July 2002).
22. One of the main objectives of the African Union is to "promote peace, security, and stability on the continent¹⁴". It has laid down as a principle the possibility of intervention in a member state in the event of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity¹⁵. It thus intends to play an active role in conflict prevention and resolution, by acquiring a real African peacekeeping capability. Like the European Union, upon which it is modelled, the AU aspires to become the main guarantor of peace and security in the region - a move set in the wider context of the search by African states for a new impetus towards development through NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development), instigated at the assembly of African Heads of State and Government in Lusaka, on 6-7 July 2001. The plan for "redevelopment" of the African continent which NEPAD embodies is based inter alia on promoting peace and stability and fostering conflict prevention.
23. Central to the arrangements the African Union is making for managing peace and security in Africa is the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Protocol relating to whose establishment was signed in July 2002 and took effect in December 2003. This is a permanent decision-making body made up of 15 elected members. Like the UN Security Council, it sees itself as the emergency response mechanism of the African Union to the outbreak of crises on the continent. It can call on other organs, including a Panel of the Wise¹⁶. It is also envisaged that it will be supported by the CMCA inherited from the OAU, "a Continental Early Warning System", a "Special Fund" and eventually "an African Stand-by Force" capable of reacting quickly in situations of conflict¹⁷.
24. However, in terms of peacekeeping the AU is a novice still, and many of the mechanisms referred to are in their infancy. Thus the early warning system needed to inform the PSC has only very limited capability as yet and cannot draw support from sub-regional bodies such as ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) SADC (South African Development Community) COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) or ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States) whose resources are virtually non existent in this area¹⁸. The African Union is also having difficulties funding its peacekeeping and conflict management programme. However, it is trying to achieve something since, at its 2^nd Conference of Heads of States held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 8 July 2004 it decided to send 300 soldiers to Darfur in Western Sudan to protect the organisation's observers, there to monitor compliance with the ceasefire between the parties to the conflict.
25. African states are demonstrating their willingness to work together over the Darfur crisis in order to bring to an end a disaster that has paralysed the region since February 2003. In particular, a summit between the leaders of Libya, Sudan, Egypt, Nigeria and Chad, held in Tripoli on 18 October 2004, produced a number of significant decisions¹⁹. Firstly, the government of Sudan announced an agreement reached during the summit that a federal Sudan might offer the best solution. Thus the Darfur region would have its own government and parliament. A joint statement also called for rebel groups to sign a humanitarian protocol. The summit also accepted the Sudanese government's decision to increase the number of African Union troops in Darfur and called on all African states to contribute to the regional force. It was also noted that talks were under way with both the European Union and the United States to provide logistics support and financial aid to the pan-African force.
26. On 20 October 2004 the Peace and Security Council of the African Union adopted a series of crucial provisions on the mandate of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and agreed to strengthen the military presence in the region²⁰. The CPS communiqué states that "AMIS shall consist of 3,320 personnel, including 2,341 military personnel, among them 450 observers, up to 815 civilian police personnel, as well as the appropriate civilian personnel". The mission of the force, deployed for a year, and whose mandate is renewable, is:

27. Supported by the EU²¹, the United States, other African nations and by Australia and Canada, AMIS will also carry out the following tasks in the framework of its principal mandate:

28. From the time the African Union came into being, a special dialogue started between it and the EU. On 3-4 April 2000 the first EU-Africa summit took place in Cairo, Egypt, for the purpose of setting up a constructive relationship between the institutions representing the two continents. Section V of the Plan drawn up at the summit deals with "peace-building, conflict prevention, management and resolution²². Since then, both sides have shown willing to continue the dialogue. The year 2003 saw a substantial increase in the number of meetings between their representatives. Thus a meeting between Said Djinnit, African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, and Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, took place in April 2003²³. The dialogue continued at an EU-Africa meeting at the level of the Ministerial Troika, held in Rome in on 10 November 2003. The strategic nature of the EU-AU partnership was once again affirmed and strengthened. On this occasion the machinery for EU-AU dialogue was restructured for greater effectiveness and recentred on common priorities, including peace and security matters²⁴.
29. The EU, considering that "The primary responsibility for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African continent lies with Africans themselves"²⁵, could not do other than approve and support the AU in its efforts for peace. Moreover, it recognised that "the AU and African subregional organisations constitute the central actors in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa"²⁶. It repeatedly welcomed the AU's progress in this sphere, particularly in establishing the PSC. In the Declaration issued at the close of the Addis Ababa summit on 6, 7 and 8 July 2004, the EU congratulated the AU on "the considerable progress made in achieving its objectives (...). The last year in particular saw considerable progress by the AU towards establishing a continental architecture for peace and security"²⁷.
30. The EU therefore made this regional organisation the centrepiece of its Africa policy. On 26 January 2004, in its Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, the member states reaffirmed Europe's support for AU action in this sphere²⁸. Here the EU pledged its support for the AU in seeking peace in Africa. One example of this has been in Darfur, in 2004, where European experts joined the African observation mission to that region. In its plan for conflict management architecture in Africa, the AU envisages drawing support from various subregional organisations. The EU must therefore similarly turn towards those organisations and possibly provide them with assistance. Once such organisation, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has been concerned with issues of regional peace and security since its inception in the 1970s.
31. With the setting up of ECOMOG²⁹, in 1990, ECOWAS became a major player in peacekeeping in Africa. During the 1990s, ECOWAS deployed ECOMOG forces on a number of occasions to guarantee compliance with agreements for the cessation of hostilities, in particular in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. This subregional organisation has since continued to affirm its role, as the presence of ECOMOG forces in MINUCI³⁰ (Côte d'Ivoire) amply demonstrates. Nevertheless, notwithstanding its military successes, it suffers from glaring deficiencies in terms of personnel training and equipment. The most blatant shortcomings are to be found in its virtually non-existent planning structures and limited early warning system. Intelligence gathering and processing are essential factors in detecting and forestalling potential conflict and for being able to take adequate response measures in the event of a crisis. ECOWAS is still seeking to develop its peacekeeping capability. Thus, on 18 June 2004, the military chiefs of staff of the 15 members of the organisation, meeting in Abuja, approved the setting up of a force of 6 500 troops, deployable in the event of a crisis, which would include a rapid response element of 1 500 soldiers. An informal meeting of the 16 ECOWAS Foreign Ministers and their EU counterparts on the subject of international cooperation on peace and security took place in the Netherlands, on 4 September 2004.
32. Other African subregional organisations have expressed their concerns about peacekeeping and conflict prevention issues. The member states of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)³¹ decided in Yaoundé, on 25 and 26 February 1999, to set up a Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX)³². An organisational structure for a crisis management system comparable to that of the AU is envisaged. Taking a similar view, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has structures for enhanced political and military cooperation between member states in regard to crisis-management issues.
33. Generally speaking, the peacekeeping capabilities of all African regional and subregional groupings are limited. There needs to be a sharing of responsibilities between Africans and Europeans. The African states must have primary responsibility for preventing conflict and keeping the peace, in the context of a strategic partnership developed between the EU and Africa. The Union and the European Commission are providing considerable assistance, particularly in terms of funding, for African political and military crisis-management capabilities.

(b) The role of the European Commission

34. Apart from the action taken by individual countries, the European Commission is responsible for the economic and human dimension of Europe's contribution to security in Africa. The economic "partnership" between Africa and the EU helps promote economic development on the continent by offering producers in certain sectors preferential terms in the European markets Humanitarian aspects are the responsibility of the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) which plays a crucial role in Africa. It it was through ECHO that the EU recently earmarked 18 million euros in humanitarian aid for victims of the conflict in Sudan including 10 million euros to address the needs of displaced populations and 8 million euros to help refugees from Darfur that had fled to neighbouring Chad³³. In June 2004, the EU member states agreed on an emergency aid package totalling 12 million euros. It was allocated to the peacekeeping mission for which the African Union has responsibility on the ground.
35. In March 2004 the European Union member states adopted the Commission's proposal for the creation of a 250 million euro African Peace Facility. The idea was launched by the AU at its summit in Maputo, Mozambique in July 2003. The approval sets an example of effective cooperation between the EU and the AU; it shows that ambitious programmes in the areas of peace and security can be conceived within the African continent through regional cooperation and that they can be funded by the EU in order to achieve their goal. The African Peace Facility aims to support African efforts to promote peace across the entire continent it is based on the principle of African ownership and the AU will play a central role in its decision-making process. The African Peace Facility will not finance European peacekeeping operations.
36. The problem of the AIDS pandemic is another issue which has been under the European Union and international community spotlight. AIDS has reportedly killed 25 million people in Africa, 8 500 per day, and by 2010 the toll is expected to reach 80 million³⁴. There are a number of international community projects designed to tackle the pandemic, the most significant being the European Commission's Programme for Action on Communicable Diseases, the US Emergency Plan for AIDS relief, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. More specifically, the European Commission's Programme for Action on Communicable Diseases has allocated over € 1 billion³⁵ to fight AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis between 2003 and 2006, with the main target being prevention, care and treatment efforts.

(c) The role of the UN

37. The United Nations' presence in Africa - past and present - has also been very important in every field, from humanitarian to economic aid and peace and security. The UN has seven ongoing peacekeeping operations on the continent in the following countries: Burundi (UNOB), Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), Liberia (UNMIL), Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and Western Sahara (MINURSO). Although each mission is designed specifically for the target region or country and has its own specific set of mandated tasks, through the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), all missions share certain common aims: "to alleviate human suffering, and create conditions and build institutions for self-sustaining peace. The substantial presence of a peacekeeping operation on the ground contributes to this aim by introducing the UN as a third party with a direct impact on the political process. In the exercise of its tasks, DPKO aims to minimise the many risks to which peacekeepers may be exposed in the field."³⁶ Furthermore, these missions are required to:

38. In addition to peacekeeping operations, the UN cooperates with African states on programmes designed to help resolve specific problems on the African continent. In September 2002, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the new partnership for Africa's development (NEPAD). NEPAD's primary objectives are to help Africa help itself and to ensure a sustained UN commitment to support Africa's development efforts through: Coordination, Capacity building and Partnerships³⁸. More specifically, NEPAD aims to:

39. Other global programmes and offices which are designed to address the specific problems in Africa and to provide aid through the UN include: the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) focusing upon development policy as well as food security and sustainable development; the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) focusing upon rural poverty as well as the AIDS pandemic; UNAIDS, a UN joint programme on HIV/AIDS; the UN Development Programme (UNDP); the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA).
40. It is not, however, only large international organisations which are involved in the Africa question. A multitude of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have also begun operating on the continent in the recent years. NGOs operate under their own mandate, mainly providing emergency and short-term relief to internally displaced persons (IDPs). Although their presence in Africa is important it can also have adverse effects as many NGOs tend to compete, therefore placing their own priorities before those which are aimed at solving real regional problems. Furthermore, as they are present in the field only when there is a crisis, this creates a lack of long-term development projects which slows down the process of finding a final settlement of all the problems that exist.

41. Crisis management planning and operations in Africa present a new and multi-faceted challenge for the EU. A number of factors have to be taken into account for planning to be effective. These include distance but the EU' experience in crisis management and peacekeeping has been near its borders in the Balkans. The African continent can be seen as a major step towards increasing the Union's actions out-of-area. Also to be considered are the international and regional organisations which are active in Africa.
42. Relations and cooperation must be established with bodies closest to the continent's problems - this has already been done in various instances with African organisations such as the AU. Regarding the UN, cooperation between the two organisations on crisis management has been discussed and steps to build upon the momentum have been taken. In particular, further enhancement and compatibility in crisis management have been discussed in the following areas: (i) planning; (ii) training; (iii) communication and (iv) best practices - which includes a "regularised and systematic exchange of lessons learned and best practices information, including sharing of information on mission hand-over and procurement"⁴⁰.
43. The EU also has to find efficient ways to adapt to the specific and unique problems in Africa, which can include a combination of situations ranging from conflicts to refugees to epidemics. Implementation of the Petersberg tasks is crucial and must be planned in close cooperation with local populations and forces in order to provide training and plan for future and long-lasting support in the continent's troubled regions. In addition, the EU is currently supporting - mostly through financial aid - a number of projects and missions in Africa, the most important developments being the African Peace Facility, the African Mission in Burundi and the EU decision on the establishment of a Peace Support Operation Facility for the African Union.

1. Lessons from Operation Artemis

44. Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the first military crisis-management intervention the EU has undertaken outside the continent of Europe. A Petersberg-type mission, it is the first to be implemented entirely autonomously, without recourse to the "Berlin plus" arrangements and hence to NATO assets. Through such action the CFSP and ESDP have become more "visible" to European Union citizens. The EU is thus acquiring greater credibility on the international stage and affirming its role as a political and military player in the settlement of international crises and conflicts.
45. Operation Artemis, which is taking place in the area around Bunia in the north of the DRC, is tangible evidence of the Union having a policy towards Africa. That policy aims to foster the values of peace, human rights and democracy. The ability to become involved in humanitarian and peacekeeping action in Africa is, for Europeans, also a way of promoting regional stability and thus helping develop a safer world according to the terms of the European Security Strategy, adopted in December 2003. As well as offering a show of its military strength, the EU is providing confirmation of its resolve to implement policies projecting stability and security in a changing world.

(a) Operation Artemis: objectives and results

46. Since 1998, the Democratic Republic of Congo has been riven by a civil war in which neighbouring states have also become involved. In July 1999, with the signature of the Lusaka Agreements, a ceasefire and inter-Congolese dialogue were established under United Nations auspices. As a result the DRC and Ugandan Governments signed an agreement in Luanda (Angola), on 6 September 2002, whereby Ugandan troops would withdraw from Ituri province in the north west of the country. Following their withdrawal, fighting resumed between the different armed factions in Ituri's regional capital, Bunia. Clashes between militia from the Lendu and Hema tribes resulted in a humanitarian disaster. United Nations investigators reported massacres from February 2003, while some 500 000 to 600 000 people were displaced throughout the region⁴¹. On 23 April MONUC⁴² began deployment of 700 Uruguayan "blue berets" in Bunia. However those forces had neither the means nor the mandate to deal with the situation. They could not bring the violence that continued throughout May 2003 between the UCP⁴³ Hema militia and Lendu armed gangs to an end. As a result, given the seriousness of the situation, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan called on France to head an multinational force to restore calm to Bunia.
47. On 16 May, France confirmed its willingness to accede to the Secretary-General's request, provided certain conditions were met: a precise mandate from the UN, the mission to be subject to strict, geographic and time constraints, and agreement to it on the part of the Ugandan and Rwandan authorities. On 30 May, when all the conditions had been met, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1484. Pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, this "authorises the deployment until 1 September 2003 of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia (...) to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town⁴⁴. The force's task was to stabilise the situation in the Ituri provincial capital pending the arrival of a much larger and better equipped MONUC force than the Ugandan battalion. France set up operation "Mamba" and on 5 June the EU adopted a "joint-action on the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo"⁴⁵. In point of fact the European Union is heavily involved in the region through its ECHO⁴⁶ humanitarian aid programme and was therefore well placed to carry out such a peacekeeping operation. On 12 June the decision to place the Ituri intervention under EU auspices was confirmed by the EU Council. Hence on 16 June 2003, "Mamba" became the peacekeeping mission "Artemis", under Article 14 of the Treaty on European Union.
48. France took up its position as the operation's "framework nation", providing 1 679 of its 2 060 personnel. The United Kingdom, Belgium, Sweden, Germany, Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal all play a very active part in "Artemis". Three non-European nations, South Africa, Canada and Brazil, have joined forces with the EU in providing troops for this operation. A total of 18 nations from three continents are involved in the mission⁴⁷. The various ESDP bodies all have their part to play. The troops engaged are under the political authority of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), itself answerable to the Union Council. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is supervising the conduct of the mission and liaising with the operation commander, General Neveux (France), in charge of the "strategic" HQ in Paris. This consists of almost 100 military personnel, representing all Artemis participants. The forces on the ground are under the command of General Thonier (France) whose command post is located at the airport at Entebbe, the Ugandan capital, some 300 kilometres from Bunia, where the mission's logistics support base has been set up. He also has an outpost in Bunia.
49. The only real access to Ituri's main town is a small, rough and ready airstrip, accessible only by C130 Hercules or C160 Transall tactical transport aircraft. Operations are being carried out from this runway. Moreover the area of action is confined to the airport and the town of Bunia and the immediate surrounding areas⁴⁸. The ground forces consist of two components a French and Swedish "special forces group" and a French "tactical group" comprising the force's main infantry and armoured elements. South African Oryx helicopters, Belgian medical units and United Kingdom specialists in charge of airfield installations maintenance are also present in Bunia. The 1100 or so personnel based in Ituri are also supported by a French tactical airborne force. This consists of Mirage F1 and 2000 capable of reconnaissance missions and ground strikes, and has proved a major deterrent presence to the various militia. The bulk of the European effort has been concentrated on the transport by air to Entebbe of all the various components and on the projection of forces on Bunia. This has required no less than 526 round trips by tactical transport aircraft between the Ugandan capital and the theatre of operations. The major contributions in this area towards accomplishing the mission have come from France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, Canada and Brazil.
50. On 6 June 2003, the special forces took up position and secured Bunia airfield. The arrival of the initial detachments in-theatre took place without upset. Nevertheless, the operation commander took a firm stance against the militia that were terrorising the local civilian population. General Thonier advised his men to "hit back hard, the first chance you get⁴⁹". The Europeans retaliated to every provocation or attack by the militia, two of whose number were killed on 16 June by special forces returning fire. By being there, and taking action, the European brigade was able gradually to bring an end to the looting and violence in the town. On 21 June, it succeeded in forcing the 2 500-strong UCP, then in control of the area, to withdraw. As the Artemis contingent took charge, the European troops extended their control to the whole of the town and the immediate surroundings. On 8 July 2003, Bunia had been secured and declared "a weapon-free town". The tactical group established support posts barring all accesses. The hard line adopted against the militia was scrupulously maintained throughout the intervention. Thus, on 11 July, following provocations, 300 European troops moved in on a Hema militia camp, thought to be too close to Bunia. Heavy weaponry was thus neutralised while the UCP withdrew from the region. Right up until the operation ended, patrols took place outside the town to prevent new outbreaks of violence. At the beginning of August, but above all from the middle of the month, arrangements were put in place for pulling out the troops. The last units left Bunia on 6 September and on 25 September 2003 the Entebbe support base ceased to function
51. In the field, Operation Artemis was an undoubted success. The European Union forces were able to carry out all the tasks set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1484. As a result of their action, Bunia, its airport and the refugee camp there are all contained within a secure, weapon-free area, protected from any militia violence. The European forces were able effect a considerable improvement in the humanitarian situation by restoring the security conditions necessary for NGOs⁵⁰ and the World Food Programme to get aid through to the local population and the refugees. Bunia saw a return to normal working life and a part of the townspeople that had left moved back. All this amply demonstrates the success of the first European Union autonomous peacekeeping mission in Africa - as does, from an operational point of view, the fact that there were no losses from the ranks of Operation Artemis. Deterrence prevailed over violence and, consequently, loss of life among the militia was also minimal. On 1 September 2003, General Thonier handed over responsibility for the Bunia sector to MONUC, substantially reinforced by a new United Nations mandate⁵¹ and the deployment on the ground of a new brigade - a 5 000-strong force of "blue berets" from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Indonesia. They were able to take advantage of the intelligence gathered by the Operation Artemis forces and the positions established by them.

(b) Concept, progress and shortcomings

52. The success of Operation Artemis is also that of the "lead nation" concept. The idea was developed and approved in the WEU context in 1997⁵². It involved a member country with appropriate means being given charge of operations as they arose. The aim was make it possible for WEU to carry out a Petersberg-type action with complete autonomy. The concept meant setting up a European HQ based on national assets as quickly as possible. Its successful implementation in the EU framework in the case of Operation Artemis has confirmed its validity. Indeed France's taking charge of the intervention in Ituri meant the arrival of the first troops only a week after the UN Security Council had adopted Resolution 1484, while the mission's European "strategic" HQ in Paris was fully operational from 16 June. If this example is anything to go by, use of the "lead nation" concept amply provides all the flexibility and ability to respond needed for carrying out many peacekeeping missions in Africa.
53. Artemis is a further proof of the progress made by the Union in terms of cohesion in foreign policy and defence issues. The setting up of the strategic HQ attests to the capability of the various European Union armed forces to work together within an operational framework. The participant countries were widely represented and took on responsibilities. However, progress still needs to be made in this area. The "multinationalisation" of HQs at times proved rather "chaotic"⁵³. Even so, over three quarters of the military staff employed were from the "framework nation". The number of non-French contributions in the field in Bunia was small. The only land-based components were from Sweden, the United Kingdom, South Africa and Belgium, which fielded medical teams. On the other hand, the highly multinationalised tactical and strategic air lift operated flawlessly. The European Union also demonstrated its ability to operate in a wider multinational context: Canadian, South African and Brazilian assets were all fully integrated into the Artemis force.
54. With this intervention, the European Union succeeded in overcoming a major hurdle: rapid projection of an entire force in an operational context, at a distance over 6 000 kilometres from Europe. Within a very few days, Europeans were able to set up a support base from scratch in a disused sector of Entebbe airport. However, this was possible only by using chartered long-haul civilian bulk carriers between Europe and Uganda. Antonov 124 aircraft able to carry freight in excess of 80 tonnes over long distances were the only way of ferrying the 3 400⁵⁴ tonnes of stores needed for the operation. Artemis serves to illustrate yet again European armies' shortcomings in terms of strategic lift capability.
55. Strategic transport assets are vital if Europe intends to continue to play a major part in peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa. Regarding tactical transport, for forces projection in Ituri, use was made essentially of American-built Hercules C130 aircraft. This model, designed in the 1950s, has in many cases seen upwards of 30 years' service in the air forces of Europe. Furthermore, its limitations in terms of mass and lift capacity mean the number of round trips required is high. The problem faced with the Franco-German built C160 Transall carrier is identical and serves to explain why a more rapid build-up of Artemis forces on the ground was not possible.
56. Commissioning of the new Airbus A400M military transport aircraft should undoubtedly bring about a vast improvement in the situation. Had it been available, it would have been possible to transport forces directly to Bunia, without needing to unload at Entebbe. Over that distance, however, the payload would still, however, have been no more than 20 tonnes⁵⁵, four times less than a civilian Antonov 124. Recourse to supplementary A400M transport assets must therefore be envisaged. Still, the deployment of European troops was achieved relatively quickly, thanks to an effective combination of different assets of the various nations involved. The experience gained from the action in Ituri can be but an incentive to European Union members to move further in the direction of shared air military transport assets to make them even more efficient in economic and operational terms.
57. While there is no denying the success of the European Union's first autonomous military mission outside its own continent, the fact that it was of a limited nature has to be acknowledged. Operation Artemis involved a mere 2 200 troops⁵⁶. It was consciously designed as a mission limited in time - three months - and in terms of its geographic cover. According to the head of operations in Bunia, the force was also deliberately "pared down to a minimum⁵⁷" as compared with the number of combatants making up the militia it was sent to neutralise. Europeans successfully carried out a low-intensity "Petersberg" task under their own steam, but the complexity of setting up Operation Artemis raises question marks over European Union capability to mount a higher-intensity peacekeeping mission or intervention requiring more assets.
58. A recommendation for the development of the infrastructure and logistical capabilities essential for deploying and sustaining forces and equipment in larger numbers for external operations would seem to be in order. It is also necessary to develop more standardised European communications capabilities in order to have a more efficient chain of command. Such capabilities must be able to generate higher data and information streams. In short, what is obvious, yet again, are the limits, and lack of interoperability, of the information and command systems of the different countries taking part. This shortcoming was made good by resorting to the presence of liaison officers and traditional telecommunications.
59. Operation Artemis is a significant departure for the European Union. The lessons learned from it have an input into the continuing development of the European security and defence policy. It highlights both the Union's real capabilities and the areas in which these are lacking, the most significant of them being of a political order. The goal of the interim emergency multinational force was simple and limited, involving securing a town that had fallen victim to violence perpetrated by armed militia. Thus the need for close real-time supervision on the part of the political authorities never surfaced as an issue. As the force's mandate was clearly defined, the military leaders in the field had a completely free rein. However, had the situation been more complicated or sensitive, or the operation conducted on a larger scale, more sophisticated political control would have been necessary. The absence of effective political support in the longer term is to be regretted.

2. Military cooperation between Europe and Africa

60. The changing face of Africa has created the need for Europe to respond differently in order effectively to tackle the problems that arise. Whereas in the past the nature of military cooperation with Africa relied on bilateral talks between western European and African states, in recent years the EU has been increasingly present in cooperation with other international and regional organisations such as the UN and the AU as well as with individual countries. The present and future role of individual states is not a passing one. They possess many years of experience in the field, and with the African community. Moreover, they have shown they are prepared to act swiftly and deploy significant resources without having to depend solely on international organisations. An example is the P-3 initiative, established in 1997 by France, the UK and the United States. The programme sought to develop and harmonise the peacekeeping abilities of the three countries on the African continent, as well as strengthen the abilities of African countries to develop their own capabilities after UN mission presence began to dwindle.

(a) Assistance to African forces - European and bilateral programmes

61. A number of military programmes and missions by European states are currently operational in Africa. France's long-standing role there today makes the country one of the most significant players in the fields of military cooperation and peacekeeping. Belgium too is very involved in civilian and military assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Development aid in the economic and social sectors (schools and hospitals) is supplemented by programmes for the setting up or reform of police and military forces for that country. Belgium is training Congolese officer cadets in Belgium itself and is involved in setting up a national army in the RDC, with the help of South Africa.
62. The French Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) programme, established in 1997, is a response to the desire of African countries to develop the military capacity of African Armed Forces for peacekeeping actions. RECAMP is based on four distinct principles: (i) multilateralism; (ii) openness, (iii) transparency and (iv) a standby basis, to ensure that it does not create regional imbalances. Over the past seven years, under RECAMP, France has been active in a number of sub-Saharan countries and in various ways: field training, supporting local military schools, equipping troops, increasing the African militaries' logistics capabilities and supporting the military work of regional organisations.
63. The United Kingdom's military support to African states has also played a crucial role in the development and effectiveness of local peacekeeping operations. The UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme - part of the multidimensional Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) - came into effect in 2001 and places high priority on developing the abilities of African (and non-African) states, as well as regional organisations, to undertake peacekeeping activities. Britain also focuses its training through the British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTs) which have been active since the 1970s in Ghana, through the 1980s in Zimbabwe and in South Africa in the mid-1990s. In 2000, additional teams were operating in Sierra Leone and in Kenya. Britain has also outlined ambitious programmes for African countries through its Ministry of Defence Public Service Agreement (PSA) for 2005-06 to 2007-08. The aim of the PSA is to: "deliver security for the people of the United Kingdom and the Overseas Territories by defending them, including against terrorism, and act as a force for good by strengthening international peace and stability"⁵⁸. The three main objectives of the PSA are: (i) achieve success in military tasks at home and abroad; (ii) be ready to respond to the tasks that might arise and (iii) build for the future. In particular, the PSA focuses on the DRC, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Sudan and outlines a number of aims for each country to improve stability and good governance and reduce conflict. In addition, regarding African peacekeeping, plans to increase the AU's capacities in this area are outlined and there are plans for setting up a Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) in 2004.
64. Military cooperation in Africa has also been achieved on a multinational level and under the auspices of the UN. One such example is the multinational Stand-By High Readiness Brigade for United Nations operations (SHIRBRIG). SHIRBRIG is a multinational brigade that can be made available to the UN as a rapidly deployable peacekeeping force. Its current members number 16: Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. There are 5 observer countries: Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Jordan and Senegal. To date it has been used as a deployment force in the UN missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

(b) Euro-Atlantic dimension of military cooperation

65. The most important steps towards a US peacekeeping policy in Africa were taken in 1996, with the creation of the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF). The Force was primarily designed to respond to the humanitarian crisis that was on the verge of erupting in Burundi in the summer of that year. However, it generated very little support and was therefore substituted by a less controversial programme, the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). ACRI focused on training the African military to respond to humanitarian and peacekeeping relief operations. It set out to train approximately 12 000 African troops, through classroom lessons and field training (classroom lessons were also provided for civilian government officials). The initiative's principal aims were to:

66. Following the completion of ACRI, it was transformed under the Bush Administration into a new programme, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance programme (ACOTA). ACOTA focuses mainly on training military trainers and also equips African national armed forces. One of the main differences between ACRI and ACOTA is that the latter also includes weapons training, as well as increasing the experience of troops in areas such as human rights, interaction with civil society, international law, military staff skills and small unit operations. It is estimated that, through ACOTA, funding for African peacekeeping will rise to 15 million dollars in 2004 from a previously planned 10 million dollars⁵⁹.
67. Other noteworthy US peacekeeping programmes in Africa over the past few years have been the International Military Education and Training Programme (IMET), which trains African military officers from 44 countries in US facilities; the African Regional Peacekeeping programme (ARP), training mainly Nigerian, Senegalese and Ghanaian units stationed in Sierra Leone as well as Guinean units in Liberia; the Joint/Combined Exchange Training programme (JCET), training small units (approximately 150 soldiers) over a period of a month (this programme did not include peacekeeping training); and Operation Focus Relief (OFR) which was designed to train African battalions for peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, with a response capability of 30 days.
68. The Euro-Atlantic dimension of military cooperation does not just provide military training and support for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The US is also concerned about further activities within African borders, principally terrorism. In November 2002 the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) was agreed with Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania; it is a US-led effort to assist these countries in "detecting and responding to suspicious movement of people and goods across and within their borders through training, equipment and cooperation"⁶⁰. The two main goals of the PSI are waging war on terrorism and enhancing regional peace and security in Africa.

---

APPENDIX I

1. There are four major programmes administered by European countries and by the United States for the purpose of assisting the armed forces of various African countries to acquire modern peacekeeping capabilities. In the main they consist of three components: training for African military personnel (officers or units as a whole), training for forces and the provision of equipment. The aim is to enable the beneficiary countries to take part in regional or sub-regional operations carried out on behalf of the African Union or the United Nations.
2. The political origin of the programmes is to be found in a tripartite declaration (United States, France United Kingdom) of 22 May 1997 known as the P3 Initiative whose underlying beliefs are as follows:

3. The three countries are involved in developing a system of training programmes and "work together in promoting a joint initiative to strengthen the capacity of African countries to participate in peacekeeping under the auspices of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and the UN" ⁶². Each country maintains its national programmes (in tandem with its bilateral relations and political opportunities as they arise), but each acts in a more coordinated fashion than in the past with its other partners with similar programmes. The four guiding principles are: long-term capacity enhancement, legitimacy, openness and transparency⁶³. The P3 Initiative also has a political dimension (regional stability and security, defence of national interests and, in the case of the United States today, participation in the international fight against terrorism).

The RECAMP programme (France)

4. The RECAMP programme (Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities) was first presented at the Franco-African summit at the Louvre in 1998. It is built around four main principles: multilateralism for the purposes of participation, openness in respect of the continent as a whole, transparency and forces on standby. It has three major objectives:

5. To date there have been four RECAMP sessions:

6. The assets of the RECAMP programme have been and continue to be used for real operations in the event of crises or to prevent tensions escalating. This was the case for the Senegalese forces engaged in the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and for the ECOWAS forces in Côte d'Ivoire. However, France cannot single-handedly fund all the projects in the RECAMP programme since the cost of maintaining the equipment storage depots is relatively high. Assistance from other donor countries is necessary for the programme to continue.
7. France is also helping to develop peacekeeping capabilities through a series of initiatives taken under bilateral defence agreements concluded by some of its former African colonies. For a number of years the French Government has been helping to train and equip personnel responsible for equipment and vehicle maintenance, particularly in Cameroon. For many years a considerable number of African officers and NCOs have been receiving training in various French armed forces staff colleges. Furthermore, joint exercises are regularly conducted by the French army and its African counterparts.

The United Kingdom's African peacekeeping training support programme

8. Compared with RECAMP and the US programmes, this is a relatively modest programme intended mainly for officers responsible for instruction and training in the various African forces concerned. The objective is to "train the trainers". The main component consists of the British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTs) who take part in training the armed forces of the many nations supported by the British worldwide. The BMATTs have been in existence for a long time − since the 1970s − and were not specifically intended to focus on imparting peacekeeping techniques. The United Kingdom's objective was to help develop the military capabilities of countries with which it had concluded bilateral agreements. In the 1990s some BMATTs were transformed into proper peacekeeping training establishments. There are two such BMATTs in Africa: one in Ghana, (for western Africa) and the other in South Africa (for the southern African sub-region). Another BMATT, in Zimbabwe, had to close in March 2001 because of the political situation in that country. Each establishment provides officers with training that is mainly geared towards peacekeeping and is adapted to meet regional requirements.
9. The British programme also includes other types of training more specifically tailored to the various African countries. For instance, the United Kingdom has seconded instructors to Kenya as part of the British Peace Support Team (BPST). They work with the Kenyan government's Peace Training Support Centre (PTSC) in Nairobi. The idea is that the Kenyan forces prepare their troops with a view to their participation in UN peacekeeping operations. As a result Kenya has been able to provide sizeable contingents of blue helmet troops to serve in the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). As part of its support for Sierra Leone, the United Kingdom is involved in training its police officers and armed forces. Thus, most of the instructors in the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) in Sierra Leone are British. The Sierra Leonean army also receives equipment and weapons from the United Kingdom. Although equipping African forces is not a major priority of the programme, the UK has on a number of occasions provided funding for equipment and/or the materiel itself, e.g. for ECOMOG (the ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring group) troops carrying out operations in Liberia⁶⁶ in 1996 and for Sierra Leone from 1997 to 2000.
10. Since 2001, the United Kingdom's efforts to develop African peacekeeping capabilities have become part of a much more ambitious conflict prevention project. Known as the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP), the idea is that the various British ministries and departments concerned by such questions should work closely together and pool their financial resources to fund conflict-prevention projects. The UK has placed a strong emphasis on African peacekeeping by setting up a special fund (the Africa Pool). It has also established a network of advisors based in Africa so as to enhance its ability to analyse the problem of crisis management on the African continent.

BMATT = British Military Advisory and Training Team

IMATT = International Military Advisory and Training Team

BPST = British Peace Support Team

The ACRI, ORF and ACOTA programmes (United States)

11. The objective in setting up the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in 1996 was to prepare some 10 to 14 African battalions (about 12 000 troops)⁶⁸ for peacekeeping missions in the framework of bilateral agreements. An extensive programme of instruction and training, including exercises, was carried out in cooperation with other parties on the ground (such as NGOs). The training was given by US Army instructors on the territory of the beneficiary countries. The programme consisted of modules tailored to various specific aspects of a crisis management operation: logistics, battalion-level and even brigade-level command, joint work with other parties (international organisations and NGOs) and an introduction to humanitarian work and human rights issues.
12. Similarly to the British programme, ACRI also had a "training the trainers" component for the units concerned. Battalion preparation also included the provision of equipment. Each unit was granted 1.2 million dollars of equipment⁶⁹ for the unit as an entity but also for individual soldiers. The items were those specifically required for the missions in question such as demining and night vision equipment, or equipment enhancing forces interoperability (radio, command and communications facilities). In contrast, the United States did not provide weapons other than training munitions. Senegal, Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Benin and Côte d'Ivoire were among the beneficiary countries, Over 6 000 troops were trained under the ACRI programme. In 2002, the Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Uganda and Benin were barred from the programme, mainly because of the crises in those countries.
13. In 2000, as a result of the threat of a humanitarian disaster in Sierra Leone⁷⁰, the United States launched Operation Focus Relief (OFR) to enable African forces to cope with more testing crisis situations and be equipped with more robust weapons than those of "ACRI battalions"⁷¹. OFR was more particularly a response to the needs of the ECOWAS countries engaged in Sierra Leone through the ECOMOG force and the UN mission. Battalions from Senegal, Nigeria and Ghana were trained under this programme, which has now been wound up. The equipment dimension of OFR was different from that of ACRI in that it supplied vehicles and, above all, weapons and munitions: 60 mm mortars, M16s (Ghana and Senegal) and AK47s (Nigeria). By 1 January 2003 the United States had spent over 515 million dollars on the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone and on the support OFR.
14. In 2002, the Bush Administration decided to replace ACRI by the African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance programme (ACOTA), which is the follow-on to the previous programme. However, it differs in certain aspects. Like OFR, the purpose of ACOTA is to prepare African troops for more difficult operations carried out in a hostile environment, possibly requiring offensive action. Consequently, the training programmes include tactical combat exercises for light infantry. Similarly, "ACOTA packages" designed to equip the units being trained under the programme − for a unit value nearing some 2 million dollars − include a weapons component (including machine guns and mortars) and all the equipment necessary for combat. The new US programme is also different from ACRI in that there is more emphasis on the training of instructors so as to ensure that the capabilities of African armed forces develop over the longer term. Finally, ACOTA is intended to be more effective by tailoring training more extensively to meet the specific requirements of each beneficiary country.
15. In addition to ACRI and ACOTA, a number of lesser initiatives are helping to develop African crisis management capabilities. They mainly take the form of one-off operations providing assistance and training or of joint exercises with US forces stationed on African territory. Among these direct or indirect US contributions to the development of African peacekeeping capabilities are the International Military Education and Training programme (IMET) and Expanded IMET. Set up in the 1950s, IMET enables military personnel to attend training courses in the United States. African officers thus receive instruction in human rights and relations between civil and military authorities. In 2002, over 1 600 African officers benefited from this programme. In 2003, African military personnel on courses in the United States came from 44 different countries.
16. But the idea of developing African peacekeeping capabilities is tending to become part of a more extensive campaign to counter all the various factors that destabilise the continent − terrorism foremost among them. In Washington on 26 June 2003, President George W. Bush announced the creation of the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI), with considerable funding from the Administration⁷². The objective is to train, equip and arm the police forces and armed forces of a number of east African states, not for the purpose of peacekeeping missions but instead to seek and fight terrorist groups in the region.

The Danish programme promoting peacekeeping in Africa

17. Since 1997, Denmark has been engaged in an extensive programme mainly targeting the countries of the southern African sub-region⁷⁶. Its objective is to develop a training structure for peacekeeping in Zimbabwe with the assistance of Danish officers. However, the programme has been suspended for the time being owing to the political situation. In addition, the programme provides funding for African officers attending crisis management courses in northern European countries.
18. The member countries of the SADC have also been recipients of collaboration with BALTBAT (the Baltic peacekeeping battalion) and SHRIBRIG (Standby High Readiness Brigade). SHRIBRIG is designed to provide a framework for the peacekeeping operations envisaged under Chapter VI of the UN Charter⁷⁷. The participant countries are Austria, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden⁷⁸. Senegal is an observer in SHRIBRIG, which could in the future be extended to other African countries. The brigade, developed as from 1994, has already been deployed in Africa on behalf of the United States, notably as part of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), and has also been involved in planning for the ECOWAS mission in the Côte d'Ivoire, which was initiated in 2003.

---

APPENDIX II

Operation Turquoise: Rwanda (21 June to 30 September 1994)

1. Following the 6 April 1994 attack on President Juvénal Habyarimana's aircraft, Rwanda became the scene of the bloodiest genocide of the late 20^th century. 500 000 to 800 000 people, mainly members of the Tutsi ethnic minority, lost their lives in the massacre that was systematically planned and organised by a fraction of the Hutu majority. The international community, for a long time immobile, finally took action in June. On 22 June 1994 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 929 authorising the establishment of a temporary multinational force pending the redeployment of the UNAMIR⁷⁹ troops, with the task of "contributing, in an impartial way, to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda"⁸⁰. A some 2 550-strong French military force assisted by 500 soldiers from seven African countries (Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Mauritania, Egypt, Niger and the Congo) established, until September, a safe humanitarian zone in the south-western part of the country, enabling several thousand people to be saved from the genocide.
2. Operation Turquoise was one of the first European operations to benefit from the satellite cover provided by the WEU Satellite Centre based in Torrejón, Spain. It was possible, from an analysis of optical and radar satellite images, to pinpoint the positions of refugee camps and displaced populations and determine their size. Such images, updated on a daily basis, provided support to the deployment of the French forces, thus enabling them to come to the aid of the refugees as quickly as possible and to prevent infiltration by fighter columns.

UNAMIR: Rwanda (October 1993 to March 1996)

3. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda was set up under UN Security Council Resolution 872 adopted on 5 October 1993 as part of the peace process aimed at resolving the conflict and the marked ethnic divisions between the Rwandan Government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR). Following the Arusha peace agreements, UNAMIR was to "contribute to the security of the city of Kigali (...)", "monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement (...)","monitor the security situation (...)", "assist with mine clearance (...)", "monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees (...)", "assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities (...)", and "investigate (...) instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of the armed forces"⁸¹. Following the start of the genocide and the resumption of hostilities in 1994, the UNAMIR troops found themselves unable to deal with the situation⁸², which cost the lives of 10 Belgian blue helmets. It was therefore decided in UN Security Council Resolution 912 adopted on 21 April 1994 to reduce the strength of UNAMIR to 270 men whose job would be to "mediate between the parties" and "assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations"⁸³. The international community subsequently decided to take action and UN Security Council Resolution 918 was adopted on 17 May 1994. The mandate of UNAMIR, now entitled to a strength of almost 5 500 soldiers, was expanded to cover "the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, (...)" and the provision of "security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations"⁸⁴. The mission involved up to 5 500 soldiers (from October 1994 to June 1995) and was then progressively scaled down (to 3 571 on 3 August 1995, and to 1 821 three months later) and its activities gradually redirected towards assisting with the normalisation of the situation in the country. Among the contributing countries to the mission were Belgium (440 soldiers⁸⁵), Spain (observers), the Netherlands (9 soldiers), Poland (2 to 5 soldiers) and the United Kingdom (2 officers). Germany provided 9 police officers and Austria 15 military observers.

UNAVEM III: Angola (February 1995 to June 1997)

4. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission III was created by UN Security Council Resolution 976 adopted on 8 February 1995 in connection with efforts to resolve the conflict between the Angolan authorities and UNITA. It followed on from the first two UN missions in Angola, UNAVEM I and II, which were on a much smaller scale and composed solely of civilian and military observers. UNAVEM III's mandate was to "assist the parties in restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation in Angola on the basis of the `Acordos de Paz', the Lusaka Protocol and relevant Security Council resolutions (...)⁸⁶". The practical tasks of the civilian and military personnel were numerous, involving, in particular, security, observation, disarmament, control of the local police and military forces, the coordination of humanitarian action and supervision of the electoral process. Maximum authorised deployment was 7,000 military personnel. Deployment was relatively slow, and in July 1995 had reached only 1 900. However, by 31 March 1996 the force was practically up to its maximum strength with 6 576 military personnel, 336 military observers and 226 police observers, before being gradually scaled down again (some 3 650 military personnel on 30 June 1997). Europe was represented by units, observers and police officers from France (20 officers and observers), Italy (4 officers), the Netherlands (35 soldiers and police officers), Poland (9 observers), Portugal (357 soliders and police officers), Slovakia (5 observers), Sweden (20 observers and 10 police officers) and the United Kingdom (6 officers).

MONUA: Angola (July 1997 to February 1999)

5. The United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) was set up, under UN Security Council Resolution 1118 adopted on 30 June 1997, as a direct follow-on from UNAVEM III, with the main emphasis "on peace-consolidation, confidence-building and national reconciliation, with a view to creating an environment conducive to long-term stability in the country"⁸⁷. Authorisation was given for the deployment of only 193 military personnel at the service of 86 observers, 345 police controllers and more than 300 civil servants. However, during its first few months of existence, MONUA took over and relied upon the civilian and military structures of UNAVEM III that were still present in Angola, and which on 31 August 1997 represented a total staff (military and civilian) of 3 163. European participation in that mission was as follows: France (3 observers), the Netherlands (observers), Poland (5 observers), Portugal (365 soldiers⁸⁸, 4 observers and 38 police officers), Slovakia (5 observers), Spain (14 police observers) and Sweden (21 police officers and 3 observers).

MINURCA: Central African Republic (April 1998 to February 2000)

6. The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic was set up under UN Security Council Resolution 1159 adopted on 27 March 1998. Its mandate was to "assist in maintaining and enhancing security and stability, including freedom of movement, in Bangui and the immediate vicinity of the city", "assist the national security forces in maintaining law and order and in protecting key installations in Bangui" and to "ensure security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel (...)"⁸⁹. Furthermore it was to "assist in coordination with other international efforts in a short-term police trainers program and in other capacity-building efforts of the national police, and to provide advice on the restructuring of the national police and special police forces" and to "provide advice and technical support to the national electoral bodies (...)"⁹⁰. It took over from an inter-African force supported by France and MISAB (inter-African mission for monitoring the Bangui agreements). France (7 observers) and Portugal (2 observers) represented the European participation in this up to 1 350-strong force composed of blue helmets from Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, Chad and Togo.

UNAMSIL: Sierra Leone (since October 1999)

7. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone was set up in 1999 as a follow-on operation to UNOMSIL (UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone) in order to guarantee the implementation of the peace agreement designed to put an end to the civil war that had raged in the country since 1991. UN Security Council Resolution 1270, adopted on 23 October 1999, called on the UNAMSIL troops to "cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement in the implementation of the Agreement", "assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan (...)", "facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance" and "provide support, as requested, to the elections (...)"⁹¹. This initial mandate authorised the deployment of up to 6 000 soldiers who were to work closely with ECOMOG⁹² which was already present on the spot. UNAMSIL's mandate has since been expanded several times, for example, on the occasion of UN Security Council Resolution 1289 adopted on 7 February 2000 which gave the UN troops a number of important additional tasks. Among other things they were to "provide security at key locations and Government buildings (...)", "facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance" and "guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction"⁹³. For that purpose the maximum authorised strength of military personnel was increased to 11 100. Following the difficulties encountered by the blue helmets, in particular when 500 of them were taken hostage in May 2000 and following UN Security Council Resolutions 1299 (19 May 2000) and 1346 (13 March 2001), the maximum number of UNAMSIL troops was increased to 17 500 to enable to force to carry out its full range of tasks. The mission is still under way, but has been in the process of a gradual withdrawal since UN Security Council Resolution 1436 of 24 September 2002. According to Resolution 1537 of 29 March 2004, as of 28 February 2005 the maximum strength of military personnel will be 3 250 soldiers⁹⁴, as compared with 9 464 on 30 June 2004. Seven EU countries are contributors to this peacekeeping mission: Denmark (2 observers), the Czech Republic (5 observers), France (1 observer), Germany (16 soldiers), Slovakia (2 observers), Sweden (3 observers and 4 police officers) and the United Kingdom (23 soldiers and 1 police officer).

British action in Sierra Leone (since May 2000)

8. In May 2000, the United Kingdom unilaterally launched Operation Pallister, for which 2 000 men supported by several warships were deployed against several rebel factions, in particular following the incident in which a number of UNAMSIL soldiers were taken hostage. Most of the personnel and equipment were withdrawn soon afterwards, but part of the force stayed in place until July 2002, in particular in order to provide instruction for the local armed forces, and was deployed in crisis situations, for example when a team of British soldiers was taken hostage in August 2000.

MONUC: Democratic Republic of the Congo (since December 1999)

9. The UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, set up on 30 November 1999 by UN Security Council Resolution 1279, is part of the peace process for former Zaire, symbolised in particular by the Lusaka ceasefire agreement. Among other tasks, MONUC is to "establish contacts with the signatories to the Ceasefire Agreement (...)", "liaise with the JMC⁹⁵ and provide technical assistance (...)" and to "maintain liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance (...)"⁹⁶. Under Resolution 1291 of 24 February 2000, MONUC's maximum strength was increased to 5 537 and its mandate expanded. The UN force was instructed, in particular, to "monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire" and to "supervise and verify the disengagement and redeployment of the parties' forces"⁹⁷. On that occasion, MONUC was authorised to "take the necessary action (...) to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence"⁹⁸ in the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UN Security Council increased MONUC's maximum military personnel to 8 700 in December 2002. Following the crisis in the Ituri province during the first half of 2003⁹⁹ it was decided by means of resolution 1493 adopted on 28 July 2003 to adjust the resources and mandate of this UN force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The maximum authorised strength was raised to 10 800 and the force was empowered "to use all necessary means to fulfil its mandate in the Ituri district (...)"¹⁰⁰. On 8 July 2003 MONUC, which is currently one of the UN's major missions, was 10 443 strong, with the following European contributions: Belgium (6 observers), the Czech Republic (5 observers), Denmark (2 observers), France (8 soldiers), Germany (3 observers), Ireland (3 observers), Poland (3 observers), Spain (2 observers), Sweden (96 soldiers) and the United Kingdom (6 staff officers).

UNMEE: Ethiopia and Eritrea (since July 2000)

10. The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea was set up by UN Security Council Resolution 1312 adopted on 31 July 2000, with a view to supporting the process of cessation of hostilities between the two parties. The UN troops were instructed to "monitor the cessation of hostilities", "monitor the temporary security zone" and to "provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities (...)". It was authorised to deploy up to 4 200 soldiers¹⁰¹. That mandate was slightly adjusted by means of Resolution 1430 of 15 August 2002 in order to authorise UNMEE to actively assist the Boundary Commission. On 30 June 2004 the mission was composed of 3 681 soldiers and 215 observers. Contributors to the mission are Austria (8 observers), the Czech Republic (2 observers), Denmark (322 soldiers¹⁰²), Finland (189 soldiers), France (12 soldiers), Germany (2 observers), Greece (3 observers), Ireland (approximately 220 soldiers¹⁰³), Italy (150 soldiers), the Netherlands (1025¹⁰⁴ soldiers), Poland (6 observers), Slovakia (200 soldiers), Spain (5 observers), Sweden (13 soldiers) and the United Kingdom (3 officers).

UNMIL: Liberia (since September 2003)

11. The United Nations Mission in Liberia was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1509 adopted on 19 September 2003. In view of the scope of its mandate, a force of more than 15 000 men was assigned to it. Indeed, it has been given five wide-ranging tasks: "Support for Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement", "Protection of United Nations Staff, Facilities and Civilians", "Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance", "Support for Security Reform" and "Support for Implementation of the Peace Process"¹⁰⁵. On 30 June 2004, 13 375 soldiers, 192 observers and more than 1 000 police officers were deployed for this large-scale mission that calls for the participation of some 59 nations. The following EU member states are among the countries contributing troops or police forces: the Czech Republic (3 observers), Denmark (3 staff officers), Finland (2 staff officers), France (1 staff officer), Ireland (426 soldiers), Poland (2 observers), Sweden (233 soldiers) and the United Kingdom (3 staff officers).

Operation Licorne: Côte d'Ivoire (since September 2002)

12. In September 2002, when unrest escalated into civil war, France decided as a first step to strengthen its military presence in the country in order to guarantee the safety of its nationals. Following an agreement signed by the parties to the conflict on 17 October 2002, the French forces were tasked with protecting the ceasefire in an operation known as Licorne. They were subsequently assisted with that task by the force set up by ECOWAS¹⁰⁶, in particular as regards monitoring the buffer zone separating the territory controlled by the "New Forces" from that under the control of the government forces. That mission was confirmed by the UN Security Council in February 2003, in Resolution 1464. During the first half of 2004, responsibility for peacekeeping in Côte d'Ivoire was progressively transferred to UNOCI¹⁰⁷. Operation Licorne remains present with 4 000 soldiers at its disposal and works in close cooperation with the UN forces. The French troops, which have freedom of movement in almost the entire country, contribute to maintaining the law and order that is conducive to economic recovery.

UNOCI: Côte d'Ivoire (since September 2002)

13. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1528 the United Nations' political mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI¹⁰⁸) and the ECOWAS¹⁰⁹ forces were replaced by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), as part of the process for settling the internal conflict that has afflicted Côte d'Ivoire since September 2002. Its mandate is to conduct the tasks pertaining to the "Monitoring of the ceasefire and movements of armed groups", "Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement", as well as the "Protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians", "Support for humanitarian assistance" and "for the implementation of the peace process", "Assistance in the field of human rights", "Public information" and establishing"Law and order"¹¹⁰. France (185 soldiers and 10 police officers), Ireland (2 observers), Poland (2 observers) and Spain (observers) provide military personnel for this force, which is entitled to eventually deploy more than 6 000 soldiers. On 30 June 2004, 3 360 soldiers and 135 observers, together with a police contingent and civilian personnel were present in Côte d'Ivoire.

Operation Artemis: Democratic Republic of the Congo (June to September 2003)

14. UN Security Council Resolution 1484 adopted on 30 May 2003 authorised the deployment until 1 September 2003 of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia, capital of the Ituri province, to take over from MONUC's Uruguayan battalion which had neither the mandate nor the resources to deal with the serious disorder resulting from the conflict between two rival army groups. This was the first autonomous EU-led operation to be conducted outside Europe. France, the main contributor of troops, was the framework nation for Operation Artemis which brought together some 2 200 soldiers from the then 15 EU member states as well as from South Africa, Canada and Brazil. Present in Bunia and at the support base in Entebbe, Uganda, were forces from Belgium (60 soldiers), France (1 679 soldiers), Germany (5 soldiers), Greece (5 aviators), Italy (2 officers), Portugal (2 officers), Spain (2 officers), Sweden (75 soldiers) and the United Kingdom (115 soldiers). Their task in Ituri was to "contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town"¹¹¹. This operation was a success. Artemis remained in place until the designated date, at which time it was replaced by a new, larger and suitably equipped MONUC unit with an appropriate mandate¹¹².

---

APPENDIX III

The African Union (AU)

1. The African Union brings together 53 African nations¹¹³ in other words all the states of the continent except Morocco. It has its origins in the Declaration of Sirte (Libya) of 9 September 1999. The Constitutive Act of African Union was adopted in Lomé, Togo, and the African Union came into being in Durban (South Africa) on 8 July 2000, replacing the earlier regional organisation, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), dating back to 1963. The main objectives of the African Union are to: "achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa; defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States; accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; (...) encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"¹¹⁴. To achieve them, the African Union has an impressive set of institutions based on an Assembly of the Union bringing together heads of state and government, an Executive Council¹¹⁵, a pan-African Parliament, a Commission and a Court of Justice¹¹⁶.
2. As well as providing a framework for economic, social, political and cultural cooperation, the African Union is seeking to become the principal guarantor for maintaining peace on the continent. A further official objective of the organisation is to "promote peace, security, and stability on the continent"¹¹⁷. To that end, the organisation has set up a Council of Peace and Security (CPS)¹¹⁸ made up of 15 members. Ten of them were elected for a two-year term in 2004: Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Mozambique, Senegal, Sudan and Togo and five at the same time for a three-year term: Algeria, Ethiopia, Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa, ¹¹⁹. The Peace and Security Council has been operating since December 2003 and is an instrument for responding rapidly to the outbreak of crises on the continent. The African Union can become involved in peace efforts in Africa as a mediator in a conflict. It also wants to have the capability to build and deploy an African peacekeeping force. The European Union is using the organisation as an important contact especially in relation to peace and security matters¹²⁰.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

3. The Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States was signed in Lagos (Nigeria) on 28 May 1975, and revised in Cotonou, Benin, on 24 July 1993. This subregional organisation is made up of fifteen West African States: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cap Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. "The aims of the Community are to promote cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent"¹²¹. The principal institutions of the Community are the Authority of Heads of State and Government; the Council of Ministers; the Parliament; the Court of Justice; the Bank for Investment and Development. ECOWAS has been involved in peace and security initiatives in West Africa for many years. One of its basic principles is the "maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness"¹²². The main contributions this subregional community makes to peacekeeping are the interventions by its ceasefire control group ECOMOG, which was set up in 1990. This group has undertaken mediation, and acted as a buffer force in Liberia (from 1990 to 1998), in Sierra Leone (from 1997 to 2000) and in Guinea-Bissau (from 1998 to 1999). Other peacekeeping operations in Africa, particularly in Côte d'Ivoire since 2002, have been carried out by contingents assembled under the ECOWAS banner. A leader in the field, ECOWAS hopes to boost its military intervention capability and also to develop its conflict prevention machinery. In order to achieve this, a Committee of Wise Men was set up in Accra on 20 March 2004¹²³. The European Union sees ECOWAS as a valuable partner on matters relating to peace and security in Africa

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

4. The Economic Community of Central African States was set up on 18 October 1983 at Libreville, Gabon. Its members are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe and Chad. The aim of the Community is to "promote and strengthen harmonious cooperation and balanced and self-sustained development in all fields of economic and social activity ..."¹²⁴. The Community organisation consists of a Conference of Heads of State and Government; a Council of Ministers; a Secretariat General; a Court of Justice and a Consultative Commission. The Economic Community of Central African States also wants to play a part in peacekeeping in Africa. Thus it has set up a Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX), which is an organisation for cooperation among the member states on political and military matters with a view to promoting, maintaining and consolidating peace and security¹²⁵. The Protocol establishing COPAX was signed on 24 February 2000 in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea).

Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC)

5. The Central African Economic and Monetary Community comprises Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad - the six states which are also ECCAS members. The Treaty establishing the Central African Economic and Monetary Community was signed in N'Djamena on 16 March 1994 and officially entered into force in June 1999. This subregional organisation is the successor to the Central African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC)¹²⁶. "The Community's essential mission is to promote the harmonious development of Member States by the institution of two Unions: an Economic and a Monetary Union. In each of these spheres, the Member States intend to move from cooperation, which already exists among them, to union, with a view to completing the process of economic and monetary union"¹²⁷. The two main institutions: the Assembly of Heads of State and the Council of Ministers, have sprouted a number of executive, judicial and parliamentary bodies. CAEMC also sees itself as a nucleus of peace and stability in Africa and to that end the member states have adopted a pact for non-aggression, solidarity and mutual assistance¹²⁸.

Indian Ocean Commission

6. The Indian Ocean Commission is an intergovernmental organisation which includes among its membership Comoros, Réunion (France) Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles. It was created in January 1984 by the General Agreement of Cooperation of Victoria (Seychelles). France and Comoros joined the Indian Ocean Commission in January 1986. The Commission is responsible for "diplomatic cooperation; economic and commercial cooperation; cooperation in the field of agriculture, maritime fishing and the conservation of the resources and the ecosystems and cooperation in the fields cultural, scientific, technical, of education and justice"¹²⁹ between the member states. Its organisation consists of a Council of Foreign Ministers, a committee of permanent liaison officers and a general secretariat. The Indian Ocean Commission's main fields of activity are connected with economic development. It works in close partnership with the European Union, particularly in the framework of the Lomé (Togo) Conventions.

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

7. COMESA is a huge subregional entity whose main objectives are "to attain sustainable growth and development of the Member States by promoting a more balanced and harmonious development of its production and marketing structures [and] to promote joint development in all fields of economic activity and the joint adoption of macroeconomic policies and programmes to raise the standard of living of its peoples and to foster closer relations among its Member States¹³⁰". Its founding Treaty was ratified in Lilongwe (Malawi) on 8 December 1994. Today COMESA has 19 member countries: Angola¹³¹, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, the Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe¹³². The organisation's three main bodies are the Authority of COMESA Heads of States and Governments, the Council of Ministers and the Secretariat-General. In addition to establishing a free-trade area, another of COMESA's objectives is "to cooperate in the promotion of peace, security and stability among the Member States in order to enhance economic development in the region"¹³³.

The East African Community (EAC)

8. The East African Community is a subregional intergovernmental organisation whose members are Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda¹³⁴. Its headquarters is in Arusha, Tanzania, where its founding Treaty was signed on 30 November 1999 and came into force on 7 July 2000. It replaced an earlier organisation, East African Cooperation, which itself was the successor to the first East African Community. "The objectives of the Community shall be to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among the Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs, for their mutual benefit"¹³⁵. Its principal organs are the Summit of Heads of Government, the Council of Ministers and the Coordinating Committee, supplemented by a Court of Justice and a Legislative Assembly. The East African Community is involved in the area of peace and security as "the Partner States undertake to promote and maintain good neighbourliness as a basis for promoting peace and security within the Community"¹³⁶. In accordance with those principles "the Partner States agree to closely cooperate in defence affairs"¹³⁷.

The Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

9. The Southern African Customs Union was founded on 11 December 1969. Its membership consists of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. It guarantees the absence of customs barriers and a degree of free movement of goods and services between the five Southern African countries. The main permanent body of this subregional intergovernmental organisation is its Commission.

The South African Development Community (SADC)

10. The South African Development Community (SADC) replaced the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)¹³⁸ on 17 August 1992, the date of signature of the Windhoek Treaty. Members are currently Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The headquarters of the organisation is in Gaborone, Botswana. SADC has a number of objectives such as: "achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration"¹³⁹ and to "consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability"¹⁴⁰. To that end, the Member States signed a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation in Blantyre, Malawi, on 14 August 2001, in which SADC affirms its intention to "prevent, contain and resolve inter-and intra-state conflict by peaceful means; develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and coordinate the participation of State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations"¹⁴¹. The Protocol also provides for the establishment of ad hoc structures and bodies to take preventive action and resolve conflicts. SADC has already demonstrated that it is capable of taking action by sending a peacekeeping force into Lesotho in 1998.

The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)

11. The West African Economic and Monetary Union has eight member countries, all of which are also members of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC). They are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. These countries have a single currency − the Central African Franc (CFA), This subregional organisation has its headquarters in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. It was established under a treaty signed in Dakar, Senegal, on 10 January 1994 and revised, again in Dakar, on 29 January 2003. The West African Economic and Monetary Union seeks principally to "create a common market for the Member States based on the free flow of people, goods, services and capital, the right of individuals to set up businesses within the area, a common external customs tariff and a common trade policy"¹⁴². Its main institutions are: the Summit of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Interparliamentary Committee, the West African States Central Bank and the Court of Justice.

Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

12. The Arab Maghreb Union is a subregional organisation consisting of five North Africa States: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia. It was founded by the Treaty of Marrakech, signed on 17 February 1989. The Union aims to strengthen the ties of fraternity uniting the member states and their peoples; achieve progress and prosperity for the societies of which they are made up; contribute to preserving peace based on justice and equity; pursue common policies in various domains and work progressively to achieve the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital¹⁴³. The Arab Maghreb Union is an organisation which guarantees to safeguard the independence of its member states¹⁴⁴ through a mutual assistance agreement¹⁴⁵ in the event of aggression against any of the five countries. A semi-official body, the Joint Defence Council¹⁴⁶, responsible for peace and security issues was set up within the framework of the organisation in 1990. The decision-making body is the Presidential Council, made up of the five heads of state, with decisions taken by consensus¹⁴⁷.

---

¹ Adopted by the Assembly on 1 December 2004 at the 9^th sitting.

² Statement by Brigadier General Jean-Paul Thonier on 14 January 2004.

³ Statement by the EU special representative for Africa's Great Lakes Region, Mr Aldo Ajello and General Bruno Neveux, "Artemis" Operation Commander, on 17 September 2003; http://www.irinnews.org

⁴ As for example in Operation Turquoise led by France in Rwanda in 1994 and Operation Palliser led by the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone in 2000.

⁵ Amnesty International report 2004; http://web.amnesty.org

⁶ The fact that this has still not been done is holding up the deployment of an African Union peacekeeping force with a mandate from the United Nations. The Sudanese Government also wants the international community to give it a guarantee that the rebel forces of the Sudanese Liberation Army, which have been fighting the authorities for over a decade, will be disarmed.

⁷ UNHCR refugees by numbers, 2003 edition. Persons concerned include: refugees, asylum seekers, returned refugees, internally displaced persons, stateless and various others; http://www.unhcr.org

⁸ Document 187, Rapporteur, Mr Conte (France), 17 November 1960; Document 198, Recommendation 63, Rapporteur, Mr Conte (France), 30 May 1961.

⁹ The Assembly actively supported Operation Turquoise, led by France, and called for WEU's active involvement in its preparation and execution. Assembly Recommendation 559, 14 June 1994, in particular called on the WEU Council to "Examine at the earliest opportunity the role that WEU might play in terminating the killings in Rwanda and establishing peace and order in that country".

¹⁰ "Peacekeeping and security in Africa - conclusions drawn from the Lisbon Colloquy". Document 1648, Recommendation 645, Rapporteur, Mr Roseta (Portugal), 15 June 1999, www.assembly-weu.org.

¹¹ EU-Africa Ministerial (Troika), Dublin, 1 April 2004

http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/eu_africa/docs/communication1_040401_en.pdf

¹² Source: World Trade Organisation; http://www.wto.org

¹³ Preamble to the Constitutive Act of African Union, Lomé (Togo), 11 July 2000 ; www.africa-union.org .

¹⁴ Article 3(f) of the Constitutive Act of African Union, Lomé (Togo), 11 July 2000 ; www.africa-union.org

¹⁵ Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of African Union, Lomé (Togo), 11 July 2000 ; www.africa-union.org

¹⁶ Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 2.1, adopted at the first ordinary session of the African Union Assembly in Durban, on 9 July 2002. www.africa-union.org

¹⁷ Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Article 2.2. Idem.

¹⁸ Interim report on European Union support for the development of African peacekeeping capabilities. 28/4/2004 (document 9023/4). http://ue.eu.int.

¹⁹ BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk

²⁰ African Union, Peace and Security Council (PSC); 17^th session, 20 October 2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; www.africa-union.org

²¹ The European Commission is providing a part of the funding for this mission and the EU Military Staff is assisting AMIS and providing expertise. A European liaison officer is also permanently seconded to the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

²² Cairo Plan of Action, adopted 4 April 2000 (Document 107/9/00)

²³ Draft Presidency report to the European Council on EU activities in the framework of prevention, including implementation of the UE Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, Brussels, 8 June 2004, (document 10327/04), page 3. http://ue.eu.int/

²⁴ Brussels, 17 November 2003 14500/03 (Press 321) 2541st Council meeting - External Relations - Brussels, 17 November 2003. http://ue.eu.int/

²⁵ Preamble to the Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004. Official Journal of the European Union, 28 January 2004. http://ue.eu.int/

²⁶ Article 4 of the Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004. Official Journal of the European Union, 28 January 2004. http://ue.eu.int/

²⁷ Paragraphs 1 et 2 from the Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Africa and the African Union on the occasion of the AU summit, Addis Ababa, 6-8 July 2004, Doc 11233/04 (Press 220) Brussels, 6 July 2004; http://ue.eu.int/

²⁸ Article 4 of the Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004. Official Journal of the European Union, 28 January 2004.

²⁹ ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group.

³⁰ United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire.

³¹ Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Chad, Burundi, Rwanda, Sao Tome et Principe, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

³² Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the protocol establishing the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa; http://www.ceeac-eccas.org

³³ European Commission, ECHO, IP/04/886; http://europa.eu.int

³⁴ UNAIDS. http://www.unaids.org. In terms of population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2000 and 2004, figures show that for the year 2000 the population was 657 million (US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/) and by mid-2004 had increased to 733 million (Population Reference Bureau, http://www.prb.org/), a 12% increase.

³⁵ European Commission, http://europa.eu.int/.

³⁶ UN DPKO http://www.un.org.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ UN NEPAD www.uneca.org.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ EU Press Release: 12510/03 (Press 266); http://ue.eu.int.

⁴¹ Second special report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 27 May 2003, page 3. www.un.org.

⁴² United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

⁴³ Union of Congolese Patriots.

⁴⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1484. www.un.org.

⁴⁵ Press release, 5 June 2003. www.un.org.

⁴⁶ The European Commission Humanitarian Office. http://europe.eu.int.

⁴⁷ EU Council Conclusions adopted on 29 September 2003. http://europe.eu.int.

⁴⁸ Operation "Artemis" mission orders - presentation by General Thonier at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) study day held in Paris, 14 January 2004.

⁴⁹ "Frapper fort à la première opportunité" was the expression he used at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) study day held in Paris, 14 January 2004.

⁵⁰ Non-Governmental Organisations.

⁵¹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1493 authorises an increase in MONUC's military strength and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorises the use of force if necessary by the UN force.

⁵² WEU Council of Ministers, Paris Declaration, 13 May 1997.

⁵³ Phrase used by General Thonier at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) study day held in Paris, 14 January 2004.

⁵⁴ Presentation given by General Thonier at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) study day held in Paris, 14 January 2004.

⁵⁵ Airbus Industrie technical specifications. www.airbusmilitary.com

⁵⁶ Including the staff of the Paris European Strategic HQ.

⁵⁷ Presentation by General Thonier at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) study day held in Paris, 14 January 2004.

⁵⁸ http://www.mod.uk

⁵⁹ ACOTA. Developing Training Partnerships for the Future of Africa. Col. Russell J. Hardy USAF.

⁶⁰ US Department of State. Office of Counterterrorism. http://www.state.gov/.

⁶¹ British Perspective on the P3 Initiative for Enhancing African Peacekeeping Capability; Alice Walpole, published in Monograph 21, Resolute Partners, February 1998; www.iss.co.za

⁶² African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) Concept; European Command (United States), 16 April 1998; http://www.eucom.mil/english/index.asp

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Source: Eric G. Berman, French, UK and US Policies to Support Peacekeeping in Africa, Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Working Paper 622, 2004, pages 7 and 9.

⁶⁵ The Dakar depot also includes a field hospital with 100 beds and an additional fleet of vehicles.

⁶⁶ Funding for the purchase of vehicles.

⁶⁷ Source: Eric G. Berman, French, UK and US Policies to Support Peacekeeping in Africa, Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Working Paper 622, 2004, page 15.

⁶⁸ Sources differ somewhat as to the actual number.

⁶⁹ 1998 data.

⁷⁰ A crisis marked by the detention of several hundred blue helmet troops serving with UNAMSIL.

⁷¹ ACRI was a means of training battalions for operations envisaged under Chapter VI of the UN Charter whereas the OFR prepares units for missions envisaged under Chapter VII (coercion, use of force).

⁷² George W. Bush: address in Washington on 26 June 2003; http://www.whitehouse.org

⁷³ Source: Eric G. Berman, French, UK and US Policies to Support Peacekeeping in Africa, Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Working Paper 622, 2004, page 26.

⁷⁴ Source: Eric G. Berman, French, UK and US Policies to Support Peacekeeping in Africa, Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Working Paper 622, 2004, page 29.

⁷⁵ Situation battalion by battalion; dates indicate the month in which a unit's training commenced.

⁷⁶ More particularly the member countries of the SADC (Southern African Development Community).

⁷⁷ However, there are also plans to extend its capabilities to include the more robust missions for which Chapter VII of the UN Charter makes provision.

⁷⁸ Argentina's participation has for the time being been suspended.

⁷⁹ United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda.

⁸⁰ Paragraph 2 of UN Security Council Resolution 929 adopted on 22 June 1994 http://www.un.org

⁸¹ Paragraph 3 of UN Security Council Resolution 872 adopted on 5 October 1993 http://www.un.org

⁸² See "Operation Turquoise"

⁸³ Paragraph 8 of UN Security Council Resolution 912 adopted on 21 April 1994 http://www.un.org

⁸⁴ Paragraph 3 of UN Security Council Resolution 918 adopted on 17 May 1994 http://www.un.org

⁸⁵ Situation in March 1994, after which the Belgian contingent was withdrawn by the Belgian Government following the deaths of 10 Belgian UN soldiers during the genocide.

⁸⁶ Paragraph 1 of UN Security Council Resolution 976 adopted on 8 February 1995, http://www.un.org

⁸⁷ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), 7 February 1997 (S/1997/115), para. 30: proposals for the mandate for an observer mission in Angola to follow on from UNAVEM III, as approved in the interim report of the Secretary-General on UNAVEM III of 5 June 1997 (S/1997/430) and UN Security Council Resolution 1118, adopted on 30 June 1997, http://www.un.org

⁸⁸ During the transitional period between UNAVEM III and MONUA.

⁸⁹ Paragraph 10 of UN Security Council Resolution 1159 adopted on 27 March 1998, http://www.un.org

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Paragraph 8 of UN Security Council Resolution 1270 adopted on 22 October 1999, http://www.un.org

⁹² ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Ceasefire Monitoring Group.

⁹³ Paragraph 10 of UN Security Council Resolution 1289 adopted on 7 February 2000, http://www.un.org

⁹⁴ Paragraph 5 of UN Security Council Resolution 1537 adopted on 29 March 2004, http://www.un.org

⁹⁵ Body responsible for the ceasefire agreement.

⁹⁶ Paragraph 5 of UN Security Council Resolution 1279 adopted on 30 November 1999, http://www.un.org

⁹⁷ Paragraph 7 of UN Security Council Resolution 1291 adopted on 24 February 2000, http://www.un.org

⁹⁸ Paragraph 8 of UN Security Council Resolution 1291 adopted on 24 February 2000, http://www.un.org

⁹⁹ See, in particular, "Operation Artemis"

¹⁰⁰ Paragraph 26 of UN Security Council Resolution 1493 adopted on 28 July 2003, http://www.un.org

¹⁰¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1320 adopted on 15 September 2000, http://www.un.org

¹⁰² In 2001.

¹⁰³ In 2002 and 2003.

¹⁰⁴ In 2001.

¹⁰⁵ Paragraph 3 of UN Security Council Resolution 1509 adopted on 19 September 2003, http://www.un.org

¹⁰⁶ Economic Community of West African States.

¹⁰⁷ United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire.

¹⁰⁸ United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire.

¹⁰⁹ Economic Community of West African States.

¹¹⁰ Paragraph 6 of UN Security Council Resolution 1528, adopted on 27 February 2004, http://www.un.org

¹¹¹ Paragraph 1 of UN Security Council Resolution 1484, adopted on 30 May 2003, http://www.un.org.

¹¹² See MONUC.

¹¹³ African Union; www.africa-union.org.

¹¹⁴ Article 3 (a), (b), (c) and (e) of the Constitutive Act of African Union, signed in Lomé, Togo, on 11 July 2000 www.africa-union.org.

¹¹⁵ Made up of Foreign Ministers.

¹¹⁶ Article 5 of the Constitutive Act of African Union, signed in Lomé, Togo, on 11 July 2000 www.africa-union.org.

¹¹⁷ Article 3 (f), the Constitutive Act of African Union, signed in Lomé, Togo, on 11 July 2000 www.africa-union.org.

¹¹⁸ Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union adopted in Durban (South Africa) at the first ordinary session of the Conference of the African Union, 9 July 2002; www.africa-union.org

¹¹⁹ Decision taken by the fourth session of the Executive Council of the African Union 12-16 March 2004, document Ex. CL/78 (IV); www.africa-union.org.

¹²⁰ Article 4 of the Common Position of the Council 2004/CFSP/85 published in the EU Official Journal on 28 January 2004; http://ue.eu.int/.

¹²¹ Article 3.1 of the Treaty of ECOWAS signed in Lagos on 28 May 1975 and revised in Cotonou on 24 July 1993 www.ecowas.int

¹²² Article 4.e of the Treaty of ECOWAS signed in Lagos on 28 May 1975 and revised in Cotonou on 24 July 1993 www.ecowas.int .

¹²³ ECOWAS Executive Secretariat. www.ecowas.int

¹²⁴ Article 4.1 of the Treaty establishing the Economic Community of Central African states; www.ceeac-eccas.org

¹²⁵ Protocol Relating to the Establishment of a Mutual Security Pact in Central Africa (COPAX) signed in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea) on 24 February 2000; www.ceeac-eccas.org (French version only).

¹²⁶ (UDEAC) is one of the oldest subregional organisations in Africa. It was founded in Brazzaville, Congo, on 8 December 1964.

¹²⁷ Article 1 of the Treaty for the establishment of an Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, signed in N'Djamena (Chad), on 16 March 1994. [Unofficial translation]

¹²⁸ Signed in Brazzaville on 28 January 2004.

¹²⁹ Article 1 of the General Victoria Agreement signed 10 January 1984. www.freeport-mauritius.com

¹³⁰ Article 3(a) and (b) of the COMESA Treaty, officially ratified at Lilongwe (Malawi), 8 December 1994; www.comesa.int .

¹³¹ For the present Angola has suspended membership.

¹³² Namibia left the organisation in 2004.

¹³³ Article 3(d) of the COMESA Treaty, officially ratified at Lilongwe (Malawi), 8 December 1994; www.comesa.int .

¹³⁴ The EAC Council of Ministers approved an accession programme for Burundi and Rwanda on 10 September 2004; www.eac.int

¹³⁵ Article 5.1 of the EAC Treaty signed in Arusha (Tanzania) on 30 November 1999. www.eac.int.

¹³⁶ Article 124.2 of the EAC Treaty.

¹³⁷ Article 125.1 of the EAC Treaty.

¹³⁸ SADCC was set up in Lusaka, on 1 April 1980.

¹³⁹ Article 5 1(a) of the Treaty of SADC signed in Windhoek (Namibia) on 17 August 1992. www.sadc.int

¹⁴⁰ Article 5 1(c) of the Treaty of SADC.

¹⁴¹ Articles 2(e) and 2(k) of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.

¹⁴² Article 4(c) of the revised WAEMU Treaty.

¹⁴³ See Article 2 of the Treaty creating the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UAM), signed in Marrakech, on 17 February 1989; www.maghrebarabe.org .

¹⁴⁴ See Article 3 of the Treaty creating the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UAM), signed in Marrakech, on 17 February 1989; www.maghrebarabe.org .

¹⁴⁵ Any aggression against a member state is regarded as aggression against the other member States (See Article 14 of the Treaty)

¹⁴⁶ Eric. G. Berman and Katie E Sams, Le maintien de la paix en Afrique, United Nations Institute for Research on Disarmament, Geneva, 2000.

¹⁴⁷ See Article 6 of the Treaty creating the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UAM), signed in Marrakech, on 17 February 1989; www.maghrebarabe.org .