DOCUMENT A/1836

1 December 2003

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Rapidly deployable European air forces

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Document A/1836

1 December 2003

Rapidly deployable European air forces

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee²
by Mr Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee on 13 October 2003.

² Members of the Committee: Mr Wilkinson (Chairman); MM McNamara, Goris (Vice-Chairmen); Mr Acosta Padrón, Mrs Aguiar, MM de Arístegui San Román (Alternate: Puche Rodríguez), Barquero Vázquez, Lord Burlison, MM Contestabile, Cox, Dreyfus-Schmidt, Duivesteijn, Freiherr v. Guttenberg KT, Glesener, Goulet, Gubert, Henry, Mrs Hoffmann, MM Ioannidis, Jacquat, Jardim, Kortenhorst, Leibrecht, Lengagne (Alternate: Kucheida), Medeiros Ferreira, Monfils, de Puig, Ranieri, Rigoni, Rivolta, Schneider, Siebert, Sfyriou, Szabo, Voulgarakis, Walter (Alternate: Lord Kilclooney), Mrs Wegener.

Associate members: Mr Açikgöz, Mrs Bilgehan, MM Ibl, Çavusoglu, Hegyi, Janas, Komorowski, Lorenz, Neças, Mrs Nybakk, MM Surjan, Tabajdi, Tekelioglu, Wrzodak, N...

N.B. . The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

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RECOMMENDATION 734¹

(i) Recalling the terms of the 1999 Helsinki Declaration: "The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises";

(ii) Stressing the resolve of the EU member states to acquire the necessary military capabilities for attaining the headline goal, which means being able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50 000-60 000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks;

(iii) Recalling the decision of the NATO member states to set up a 21 000-strong NATO Response Force (NRF) capable of intervening outside NATO's traditional area;

(iv) Noting the importance of the air component in the crisis-management and peacekeeping operations of recent years in Serbia/Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq;

(v) Aware of the essential role played by air forces in missions of surveillance/reconnaissance, air superiority, power projection over a long distance, strategic and tactical transport and support for ground troops;

(vi) Stressing the shortfalls in European air force capabilities, in particular in the fields of strategic lift, UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), command structures, air-to-air refuelling and precision-guided munitions (PGM);

(vii) Noting the need for the European states to be able to establish forward bases in the theatre of operations in order to conduct local airborne operations, as well as where appropriate forward headquarters;

(viii) Aware of the need to have permanently available a carrier task group with a view to deploying air power at very short notice during an emerging crisis and throughout the time it takes to build up forward airbases and headquarters facilities in the theatre of operations,

1. Participate actively in the cooperation among European air forces in the framework of EURAC (European Air Chiefs Conference) and ECAP (European Capability Action Plan);
2. Ensure that their defence budgets are sufficient to equip and train their air forces for Petersberg-type missions that may be assigned to them under the headline goal and take initiatives to coordinate better the joint European training of crews;
3. Develop European coordination of strategic airlift in the framework of the EACC (European Airlift Coordination Cell) at Eindhoven and transform that cell into a proper European air transport centre;
4. Give high priority to the procurement of transport aircraft and in particular to completing the A400M programme within the scheduled timeframe, as well as to the acquisition of genuinely heavy-lift high volume military transports;
5. Pay particular attention to surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and in particular to organising European cooperation within ECAP with a view to the development and procurement of UAVs;
6. Acquire the air-to-air refuelling capability defined under the EU headline goal, if necessary by taking interim measures consisting of adapting existing aircraft, pending the acquisition of new purpose-built tanker aircraft, preferably from the Airbus range;
7. Secure a sufficient supply of precision-guided munitions to upgrade the capabilities of existing aircraft (Tornado, Mirage 2000, Eurofighter, Rafale, Harrier, Jaguar, F-16, etc.) and building sufficient stocks of munitions;
8. Create a genuine European combat search and rescue (CSAR) capability by setting up a "European CSAR centre" responsible for drawing up an appropriate doctrine, ensuring interoperability of assets and organising the joint training of the personnel involved;
9. Develop, in cooperation, the capacity to deploy European airbases and a European air component headquarters in a remote theatre of operations;
10. Organise cooperation among naval forces to ensure that a European aircraft carrier group remains permanently available.

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. The European Security and Defence Policy

1. At the December 1999 Helsinki Summit, the European Council stressed its resolve to "develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises".
2. At the same meeting, the EU decided to secure the appropriate capabilities for itself, a process now normally referred to as the European Union's "headline goal":

3. It should be borne in mind also that the Petersberg Declaration, adopted by WEU member states in June 1992, envisaged:

4. The principle of a European defence entity has been accepted since the December 1998 St Malo Franco-British Summit, where it was agreed that: "the European Union will (...) need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework)".
5. Since those declarations of principle, a major effort has been made and institutional crisis-management structures, both military and politico-military, have been created within the Union. The agreement allowing the EU assured access to NATO operational planning capabilities ("Berlin plus" agreement) has now entered into force (December 2002 Copenhagen Summit).
6. The European Union has declared itself capable of mustering forces as from June 2003 to carry out Petersberg tasks, as provided under the Helsinki headline goal. Corrective measures must be taken to fill the many gaps that still remain and which have been clearly identified in the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP).

2. NATO and the NATO Response Force

7. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is the result of a proposal which was initially made by the US Administration and was adopted at the Prague Summit in November 2002. It fits in with the new national security strategy adopted by the US Administration in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, i.e. the ability to conduct a war on terrorism on a global scale and combat the threat of weapons of mass destruction and terror held or in the process of being acquired by "rogue states".
8. The Prague Summit Declaration described the NRF as follows:

9. The purpose of the NRF is therefore to enable the Alliance to face up to the "new" threats of the 21^st century and react rapidly to situations similar to the 11 September aftermath - both within and outside the "traditional" area of the Alliance's responsibilities (i.e. the territory of its member states). This will make the NRF a global force with as its sole limits those dictated by politics. The force will consist of some 21 000 troops drawn from the best national units with the best training and equipment.
10. The NRF will be able to carry out the full spectrum of Alliance operations (including missions arising out of the application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty). It will be a force with a high degree of preparation and high readiness levels (HRL)³. It will be a NATO joint, trained and "certified" force which will be able to act as a stand-alone force or prepare for the arrival of follow-on forces in due course. It must have its own logistics, be sustainable in the field for at least 30 days (pending the arrival of supplies) and be able to act as an offensive combat force as well.
11. The missions for which the NRF could be used are very varied and include:

3. Crisis management and peacekeeping: air force aspects

12. Air power, on its own or in conjunction with other types of military action, offers the decision-makers at governmental level a range of options to support diplomatic and political efforts before the first shots are fired. It is a particularly effective instrument for peacekeeping operations, as illustrated by the following examples:

0. Air power can help prevent the emergence of conflict situations by making use of the third dimension for surveillance purposes. Used in conjunction with satellites, airborne systems offer the advantages of flexibility and unpredictability;
0. Provisions concerning air-based arms control systems are, for example, a key part of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Vienna document on confidence- and security-building measures;
0. The immediate response capability offered by airborne assets is important for conflict prevention. Air power can be used to issue clear political signals, thereby reducing the risk of errors of assessment, recognised as a major danger in crisis situations. It offers for that purpose a whole range of possibilities, such as placing forces quite clearly on high alert, stepping up peacetime training exercises and conducting flights close to the theatre of operations in order clearly to make one's presence felt;
0. The ability to act swiftly and strike deep into enemy territory, thereby demonstrating to the belligerent parties that their interests are vulnerable to air attacks constitutes in all respects a clear and strong deterrent to potential aggressors;
0. Peacemaking: aviation helps provide timely moral and logistic support and indeed is the best solution when logistic support cannot be delivered by land or sea due to the lack of time or to topographical factors;
0. Humanitarian assistance: the speed with which air-based assets can be deployed enables them to play a key role in alleviating the distress suffered by the civilian population;
0. Evacuation operations: often the only way of evacuating non-belligerents in emergencies is by air.

13. For the purpose of the Petersberg missions, the EU member states' armed forces must be capable of conducting "tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking". The recent military operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the importance of the air component, particularly during the first phase of combat.
14. In practice the air forces must control the skies in order to be able to destroy the command, transmissions and air defence systems of the enemy, using ground attack aircraft. Once this is done ground operations can be launched with the assistance of all kinds of close support aircraft, both aeroplanes and helicopters. Transport aircraft are then used both for the strategic deployment of troops and their tactical deployment to the theatre of operations. Finally, during the ground combat phase, logistic support is provided by transport aircraft.
15. All these aircraft must be deployed on bases close to the theatre of operations. This means being able to "project" an airbase together with its logistics to an airfield which in most cases has no proper infrastructure to start with. The alternative solution is to use an aircraft carrier in cases where the theatre of operations is sufficiently close to the sea. The two solutions may be complementary, with a rapidly deployed carrier task group being used to "project" an airbase.

4. Operational missions for rapidly deployable air forces

16. Air forces stationed on forward bases close to the theatre of operations can conduct various types of mission, such as those involving intelligence, air superiority, offensive actions and air transport.

17. This activity requires the use of reconnaissance aircraft, UAVs or, more simply, pods containing special equipment that can be transported by combat aircraft. Surveillance must include the optical and infrared areas as well as radar and electronic listening devices. Intelligence may be gathered for strategic purposes, for example to understand the enemy's posture and actions, or for more tactical reasons in connection with a specific target.

18. The aim is to guarantee freedom of action for our air forces in the theatre of operations, but also to deprive the enemy of the use of its own forces, which is crucial for the security of the deployed air base. Indeed, it is essential to guarantee air superiority above the areas in which our own forces are stationed. To do this, we must be able to manage the airspace above the theatre of operations and to create a no-fly zone for enemy aircraft. Moreover, attention must be paid to the defence of deployed air and ground forces. It may be necessary for that purpose to organise patrols whose job is to intercept airborne threats (combat air patrols). Operational missions geared to controlling the skies can also take the form of offensive actions against a potential airborne threat with a view to suppressing enemy air defences⁴.

19. This may take the form of strategic action against enemy command or transmission centres, or else it may focus on enemy air forces and the suppression of their air defence systems (radar, control centres, air defence missile batteries etc.).
20. All such missions call for the deployment of aircraft with a ground attack capability, which means using a wide range of specialised armaments: cruise missiles, guided bombs or missiles (laser, satellite positioning), anti-runway bombs or missiles, anti-radiation missiles⁵, radar and communications jammers etc.
21. Air forces must be able to provide tactical support to ground or naval forces. In addition to the abovementioned aircraft, they must also be able to deploy slower specialised aircraft such as the C130 Canon⁶, A10 anti-tank aircraft (carrying anti-tank missiles) and attack helicopters (Apache, Comanche, Tiger) or helicopters equipped with anti-ship missiles. Furthermore, all operations by plane (paradropping) or helicopter will involve the use of specialised aircraft based in the theatre of operations.

22. This concerns air support in the theatre of operations: tactical manoeuvres of ground troops (airlift, air drops), logistic movements in the theatre of operations such as air-to-air refuelling (to increase the radius of action and duration of in-theatre missions) and delivery of fuel supplies to the ground using rough airfields, combat search and rescue⁷ missions and evacuation of the wounded.

1. Afghanistan

23. The war conducted by the United States against the Taliban in Afghanistan⁸, during which aircraft were deployed in the theatre of operations, is an example which merits our particular attention as a clear demonstration of the combined use of air forces and ground troops.
24. Operation Enduring Freedom started out as a "normal" operation on 7 October 2001 with air strikes using aircraft and cruise missiles. After a week of systematic destruction of the Taliban military infrastructure and al-Qa'ida training camps, it was decided that air superiority was sufficient to move into a new phase of tactical combat against the enemy forces, using low-flying AC-130 aircraft⁹ (as of 15 October) and UAVs (as of 17 October) to target all enemy forces on the ground, regardless of size or mobility. The successful use of those aircraft was to a large extent due to the real-time acquisition and exploitation of intelligence. This was quite a feat, given that the information gathered on the ground was transmitted to the Central Command facility based in Saudi Arabia, then to Tampa in Florida and from there to the Pentagon. The order to attack or not would then follow the same route back from the Pentagon to Afghanistan. All this was possible thanks to information technology, high bit-rate large-capacity data links and the availability of an extensive network of communications satellites.
25. On 19 October, commando forces conducted a ground attack near Kandahar. More than 100 "Rangers" were flown in by helicopter to attack an airfield and Taliban command centre, destroy weapons depots and recover documents concerning Taliban and al-Qa'ida activities. This marked the beginning of a sustained operation on the ground, where armed CIA units¹⁰ had been in place since before 7 October to assist the anti-Taliban forces of the Northern Alliance and encourage armed rebellion by Pashtun tribal leaders, both allies and enemies of the Taliban.
26. In November, the Taliban forces opposing the Northern Alliance in the Mazar-i-Sharif area were subjected to intensive bombardments with high-power BLU-82 bombs which explode a metre above the ground and have a radius of destruction of 200 to 600 metres. For the first time, US cargo planes landed in Afghanistan, on a soft airstrip at Golbahar and at Bagram airport. On 9 November, Mazar-i-Sharif was occupied by the forces of the Uzbek General Rashid Dustum, and on 13 November, Herat and Kabul were occupied by the forces of Ismaïl Khan and the Northern Alliance respectively. Air and ground operations moved to Kunduz in the north-east and Kandahar in the south. UAVs, AC-130s, the Navy's F-18s and B-52s were present everywhere, but what was interesting was their use in close conjunction with each other in a totally integrated manner.
27. Striking examples of that integrated approach were given by the Pentagon to the American press agency Associated Press¹¹:

28. On 26 November, a large contingent of American marines was transported by helicopter via Pakistan to Kandahar airport. This force, backed up by Cobra combat helicopters and armoured vehicles, had the task of identifying targets and controlling the routes leading out of Kandahar and towards Pakistan and the mountainous areas of Tora Bora. That "landing", followed by the arrival in northern Afghanistan of units from the 10^th Mountain Division, marked the beginning of the second phase of operations, which took the form of conventional anti-guerrilla warfare. On 7 December, the Taliban rulers of Kandahar withdrew, leaving the town to local Pashtun groups. The Marines' camp became an arrival and departure point for the various American and European special forces units taking part in the fighting for the control of Tora Bora and Zawar Kili, which lasted until January 2002. Air forces were actively involved in those operations, dropping bombs and high-power "bunker-busters"¹².
29. All air-based assets were used to the maximum of their capacity, with various innovations and adaptations to take account of the situation on the ground. Once again, the advocates of the "all air-based" approach seem to have been proved right, for cases in which the aim is not physical occupation of the ground and provided that the right conditions are met:

2. European deployment in Manas (Kirghizstan):
an example to be followed and further developed

30. In connection with the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, the United States was able to get an airbase set up in Kirghizstan so as to open a northern gateway to the theatre of operations. Several European countries accepted the invitation to participate. The next biggest contingent after the 750-strong US Air Force group in charge of general airbase support was the French contingent composed of 450 airmen and equipped with two C135 FR tanker aircraft and six Mirage 2000 D bombers. It brought together the components of a small deployed airbase with autonomous means of operation, some of which - the security forces, for example - were combined with or integrated into those of the USAF. Then came the 250-strong US Marine Corps with twelve F18s and a mobile control centre. Also involved were the Spanish army, with two C130s and two Super Puma helicopters, Australia, with two Boeing tanker aircraft, South Korea with a field hospital, and three European countries (the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway) grouped together in a mini-coalition known as EPAF¹³, with a C130 from each of the three countries, a transit unit from Denmark and security forces from Norway. Eighteen F16s from the EPAF countries took over from the French Mirage 2000 on 1 October 2002.
31. An agreement negotiated at the end of 2001 with Kirghizstan paved the way for the setting-up of a base with its ammunition depot at the beginning of 2002. The Mirage 2000 went on their first operational missions during Operation Anaconda from 2 to 18 March 2002. The twelve F18s of the Marine Corps were deployed at Manas in April 2002. The combat aircraft based in Kirghizstan have been actively involved in war operations in Afghanistan (1 671 sorties as at 30 September 2002, including 1 200 involving the Mirage 2000 aircraft).
32. This deployment in Kirghizstan was an exceptional event for all the countries concerned. Little would they have imagined that they would one day have to set up a western airbase in a central Asian state still heavily influenced by Soviet structures and located at more than 6 000 km from the centre of Europe, and to organise such exceptional logistics. The operational missions stretched their capacities to the limit: not all combat air forces are capable of daily action in a theatre more than 1 800 km away and of flying - and refuelling - their heavily-laden aircraft over the Celestial Mountains with peaks over 6 000 metres high.
33. The five European C130s stationed at Manas were actively involved in the local transport of logistic support from western countries to American sites in the northern part of the Afghan theatre. They could have played an even more decisive role had they all been equipped with the electronic countermeasures and IR equipment enabling them to join the different sites in Afghanistan.
34. Only some of the ground-based European combat aircraft - the French Mirage 2000, subsequently replaced by the F16 aircraft from the EPAF states - had both the necessary interoperability in terms of weapons and procedures with their American counterparts, as well as the performance levels allowing such lengthy flights in a hostile environment, to be able to be integrated in the complex Afghan theatre. Indeed the mountain range posed a psychological barrier for pilots, making it necessary for France to deploy a highly specialised SAR/RESCO¹⁴ unit capable of parachuting in a command echelon to direct and manage a possible mountain rescue operation to reach ejected crew members, give them medical treatment and bring them down to an altitude compatible with the landing of a helicopter. Spain's Super Puma helicopters were sent with such a mission in mind. They arrived with no experience of high mountains or of the specific mission characteristics, or indeed of a deployment abroad, and were able to carry out their first flight only after 50 days of waiting for flight clearance. The setting up of a SAR team for this type of rescue mission gave rise to highly appreciated cooperation with the Kirghiz air force, enhanced the team's skills and confirmed the suitability of its helicopters for such missions. Its experience should provide a basis for cooperation at European level.
35. The replacement of the French Mirage 2000 aircraft with US Marine Corps F18s in September 2002 brought home more acutely the constraints of air-to-air refuelling. The Royal Air Force often has conducted air-to-air refuelling missions for aircraft of the United States Navy using the probe and drogue systems. The system used by the French aircraft had to be replaced by the rigid in-flight refuelling probe used by the US Air Force, which meant that the French C135 and Australian Boeings also had to be replaced. Thus EPAF's limited European air-to-air refuelling capabilities had to be supplemented by American tanker aircraft. Moreover, it turned out to be difficult for EPAF to organise mixed nationality patrols, since each country was bound by the rules and regulations governing its particular air force. In terms of troop support services, it also turned out to be difficult for EPAF to provide the same canteen facilities as the French, whose field kitchen could cater for more than 500 people and was much appreciated by the crews and by the European staff in general. The EPAF countries, rather than opting for the operating autonomy of the French, preferred to rely on American support. That choice may be justified by the fact that the countries concerned are more used to integrating with American forces, but might appear regrettable in terms of influence vis-à-vis the political and military authorities of the host country, with whom the French had directly negotiated all aspects of their presence such as the rental of an airfield and the installation of an ammunition depot under the best possible conditions. A European coalition would have had an excellent negotiating position.
36. In conclusion, this distant operation highlighted the current limitations of a European air forces deployment, both in terms of capabilities (air-to-air refuelling, troop support services, logistic transport) and of the rules governing the use of assets (mixing of F16 patrols, electronic countermeasures for the C130s). However, it was also a clear demonstration of Europe's resolve to cooperate in order to build a genuine capacity to defend its interests.

3. Former Yugoslavia/Kosovo (1999)

37. The crisis in Kosovo, characterised by the total absence of any direct fighting on the ground, highlighted the specific strategic characteristics of the aviation arm. Indeed, with its wide range of modes of action it is particularly well suited to supporting the political authority in its efforts to control the use of force at all times and reduce the loss of human lives.

38. The use of the air force, either on its own or in combination with other types of action, to meet political objectives, calls for compliance with a number of clearly defined principles. The military must adopt an appropriate strategy to ensure that the requirements of a graduated response, political control, reversibility and reducing the loss of human life are met.
39. That strategy must determine the choice of military targets, once the enemy's centre of gravity has been identified. Thus during the conflict, and more particularly during the second phase from the end of April to the beginning of June, the air forces carried out deep strikes against Serb army installations by day and night and in all weather conditions, helping to weaken enemy forces engaged in Kosovo and destroy the communication routes needed for their deployment. However, for political reasons, strikes against Montenegro were limited. In parallel air raids were launched against key points in the electricity network in the heart of Serbia, while deliberately limiting the scale and duration of the damage.
40. Those operations demonstrated the coalition's ability to strike at the country's vital installations without inflicting irreversible damage, which indeed would not have been acceptable to international public opinion. The Alliance was able in this way to attain the defined objectives while controlling the use of force at all times.
41. Moreover, by using precision weapons fired from a safe distance, it was possible to keep collateral damage to a minimum and reduce coalition casualties to a degree unprecedented for this type of conflict. Finally, the air operations conducted in difficult conditions against the Serb forces in Kosovo kept the enemy constantly under threat, thereby considerably reducing its scope for action
42. All this highlights the specific strategic role assigned these days to a conventional air force.

43. An analysis of operations and results provides a better understanding of the key capabilities needed to conduct a mission at European level.
44. The volume of assets deployed is a key indicator of the role played by each country. For example, of the more than 750 aircraft of all types deployed in Kosovo, over 500 were supplied by the United States.
45. The capacity for intelligence-gathering and analysis is the most important capability, not only for strategic, but also tactical and operational reasons. It provides the basis for autonomous assessment and decision-making. It calls for the ongoing gathering, processing and dissemination of information (complementarity of sensors and platforms), using high-performance and interoperable information and communications systems.
46. The command and control capabilities of coalitions are essential for controlling operational processes. They must include ground assets capable of dealing with a large number of sorties - more than 1 000 per day - as well as airborne command and control systems that for the moment guarantee the assessment and monitoring of the situation in the air, but in the future that on the ground as well. They call for the availability of adequate communications systems.
47. In the face of a highly mobile and unpredictable adversary, this conflict confirmed the need to speed up the whole cycle of operations, from the situation assessment to decision-making and then action, so as to be able to adapt and optimise air operations in real time and impose on the enemy a rate of operations that restricts its ability to rebuild forces.
48. Thus a real time reaction cell was established within the CAOC¹⁵ at Vicenza to receive information directly from the various sensors (on U2s, JSTARS¹⁶, Horizon, UAVs¹⁷). Fighter-bomber planes armed with anti-radiation missiles, following an in-flight warning could then be engaged against enemy mobile ground-to-air missile systems. This responsiveness is based on high-performance data transmission systems and on the ability of combat aircraft to receive target information and present it in a form that can be used by air crews.
49. Also decisive are dedicated air defence interceptors. The minimum acceptable capacity is expressed in both qualitative ( multi-target, fire and forget, autonomous identification) and quantitative terms (at least 20% of aircraft must possess such capabilities).
50. Protection against ground-to-air defences guarantees crew safety and air forces' freedom of action. It means being equipped with anti-radiation weapons, offensive jammers and appropriate means of self-protection.
51. Offensive action involves systems that can function by day and night and in all weather conditions. This entails not only combat aircraft, but also "smarter" munitions, in that they must be able to identify fixed and mobile targets. Precision of attacks is an essential requirement. To a large extent it is determined by the navigational quality of aircraft and weapons. Finally, mission preparation, in particular the acquisition of digitalised geographic data, must not hold up the pace of operations.
52. Air-to-air refuelling is crucial for efficient air operations. The Kosovo conflict showed that on average one tanker aircraft for four combat aircraft was necessary to provide the requisite degree of responsiveness, flexibility, effectiveness and safety.
53. Combat search and rescue operations for crews that have been shot down is another capability required for air operations. The RESCO helicopter is but the last link in a chain that requires close coordination and the use of a large number of complementary assets.
54. Finally, all those capabilities are based on a very high level of technological performance, which is absolutely essential. High bit-rate satellite transmissions will doubtless be the minimum standard that is required for future operations.

55. The United States provided the bulk of the assets used in Operation Allied Force. Europe contributed only 216 - less than 40% - of the coalition's total 546 combat aircraft. The limited nature of its contributions was particularly clear in a conflict which itself was limited in terms of scale and the volume of engaged forces. It should be noted that the Gulf conflict called for the deployment of more than 2 500 aircraft of all types.
56. The conflict brought home certain capability shortfalls in Europe:

(i) Intelligence and analysis

(ii) Command and control of operations

(iii) Action

(iv) Support

57. The aviation arm, as demonstrated by the air campaign in former Yugoslavia/Kosovo in spring 1999, is the right tool for complying with the national political requirements arising from the current types of conflict. Its characteristics, in particular its flexibility of use, make for precise political control while excluding situations that are irreversible for the adversary and leaving the door open for a negotiated solution. It is in a spirit of broader partnership and realism - based on frequent joint activities and permanent interoperability of doctrines and equipment - that allied air forces are preparing for this type of operation. These very practical efforts make them a key component of the European Security and Defence Identity.

1. Diplomatic aspects

58. The main difficulty of an air forces deployment is to find a supporting base in a neighbouring country close to the theatre of operations, such as the one in Manas, Kirghizstan, during Operation Enduring Freedom. The first step is to organise a team at European level to carry out reconnaissance of the site. In the case of Afghanistan this was done by mutual agreement among a number of countries, who sent a team to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kirghizstan in October 2001. Often, however, there are delays due to political and diplomatic constraints. In this case the permission to build a temporary munitions depot in Manas was only granted by the Kirghizstan authorities at the end of January 2002.
59. Ongoing cooperation with numerous countries of the region even in peacetime makes it easier to obtain diplomatic agreements. The case of the Persian Gulf countries, with which several European states have agreements, is exemplary in that respect: British and French aircraft could be deployed without difficulty in the region. At diplomatic level, it is often difficult to obtain overflight rights for military aircraft carrying weapons and munitions. Diplomatic coordination at European level would appear to be essential for any EU-led operation.

2. Command

60. The rapid response times required for air operations and the number of different types of aircraft being deployed (bombers, interceptors, ground attack aircraft, AWACS, tanker aircraft, UAVs, transport and attack helicopters, strategic and tactical transport aircraft etc.) make air operations highly complex to organise. This is why it is necessary to have large headquarters around the clock to keep response times to a minimum. In addition to a planning headquarters on European territory there needs to be an air component command headquarters in charge of local operational command and a combined air operations centre (CAOC) to conduct operations in real time. If the framework nation concept is applied, the cores of national headquarters need to be made multinational. At the moment, however, only one EU state is able to deploy that type of headquarters. A control centre should be an EU objective that is taken into account in the ECAP (European capability Action Plan).

3. Logistic support

61. Europe's national air forces are notoriously lacking in logistic airlift capabilities, which is why Ukrainian AN 124 heavy transport aircraft had to be chartered for the operations in Afghanistan. It is essential for a deployed airbase to receive regular and frequent deliveries of supplies from European cities so as to keep the deployed aircraft in operational condition. This means organising regular links. In the case of the Manas base the biggest problem was the shortage of long-range transport aircraft. However, thanks to the chartering of aircraft, the average rate of availability on the base was an excellent 90% for the Mirage 2000 and the C135FR tanker aircraft. Studies have shown that in order to deploy a force composed of some 20 combat aircraft and 15 000 men to a distance of 5 500 km, it is necessary to have 24 daily rotations of one 1400M and two heavy transport aircraft (AN 124s or C17s). This means that interim solutions must be found, such as leasing or predefined charter agreements, pending the arrival of the A400M, currently scheduled for 2009. Logistics is key to warfare; availability and mobility are essential. Europe needs its own genuinely heavy-lift transport aircraft.

1. European cooperation

62. Following WEU's reactivation for the purpose of crisis management (Petersberg, June 1992), a number of cooperative initiatives involving headquarters and bilateral or multilateral air forces were taken and made available first to WEU and subsequently to the EU. Foremost among them are EURAC (the European Air Chiefs Conference), the EAG (European Air Group), the EACC (European Airlift Coordination Cell), the air component of ECAP (European Capability Action Plan) and Franco-British cooperation on aircraft carriers.
63. EURAC¹⁸, which was created in 1993 at the Conference of European Air Force Chiefs of Staff, has grown over the last ten years and now brings together no fewer than 20 air force chiefs of staff. In an original format, independent of international defence institutions, it organises regular but informal meetings at the highest staff level of European air forces and is proof of their resolve to increase cooperation and contribute to the building of a European Defence.
64. Generally speaking, EURAC holds two meetings a year, chaired by the Air Force Chief of Staff of the host country. One day is given over to work and discussions while the second comprises a visit of various facilities so as to familiarise the participants with the host country's air force. EURAC has a small permanent structure consisting of a secretary who is an officer on secondment for a period of two to three years. He plays a key role in guiding the work of the various groups and preparing working meetings. EURAC's work is thus done at minimum cost in personnel terms.
65. The studies conducted under the auspices of EURAC focus on subjects such as the recruiting and training of air crews, the integration of military traffic into European airspace, the development of UAVs or, more recently, the sharing of experience during recent operations. The 2001 "EURAC Air Power Paper"¹⁹ is one of the major achievements of EURAC's members. It aimed to "enhance the general understanding of political leaders, colleagues of other services and other civil and military influential institutions about what Air Power is and the contribution it could make to defence, security and stability".
66. At the last meeting three major themes were developed: the utilisation of airspace to satisfy both military and civil needs, the use of air power to deal with emerging asymmetric threats, and lessons learned from recent operations in Central Asia. Furthermore, a number of strategic topics were debated such as the future of European airlift and the Advanced European Jet Pilot Training Project (AEJPT).
67. The EAG - European Air Group. The Franco-British Euro Air Group (FBEAG) was set up in 1995 with the aim of enhancing the capacity of the British and French air forces to conduct joint operations. From the outset provision was made for its subsequent expansion to include European countries with air forces of a similar size and with complementary capabilities.
68. Indeed, the FBEAG's activities very soon attracted the interest of other European countries, leading to two waves of applications for membership (first from Germany and Italy, then from the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain). Those countries have since joined the Group, which now bears the name European Air Group (EAG). Turkey has also applied to join EAG.
69. The EAG's only standing body is a small headquarters composed of three officers from each country and based at High Wycombe in the United Kingdom. It is led by an Air Marshal provided by the different nations on a rotating basis. Taking as a starting point a thorough understanding of the way in which the air force assets and capabilities of each member state are organised and used, its work is aimed at making gradual improvements to joint procedures and working methods. This process, which concerns all areas of air force activity with the exception of nuclear activities, is validated by means of joint exercises under the direction of the EAG and led by multilateral command structures.
70. A core activity of the EAG headquarters is its ongoing effort to promote technical interoperability among the air forces of the countries concerned. Indeed, under its auspices numerous agreements have been concluded in such areas as reciprocal air defence training, interoperability of air-to-air refuelling assets, exchanges of data among low altitude flight detection networks, exchanges of air transport and air-to-air refuelling services and twinning arrangements. In parallel, it facilitates all kinds of exchanges and cross training schemes (flights using night-vision equipment, training of officers for headquarters activities and multinational air operations centres (JFACC²⁰ and CAOC²¹). It also provides a framework for coordinating national air force exercise schedules. Furthermore, it conducts assessments of member states' current and future capabilities with a view to coordinating their action and proposing new forms of cooperation and optimisation (CSAR, UAVs).
71. It is under EAG auspices that the seven member states conduct the VOLVANEX exercises, with a view, among other things, to testing the organisation and transmissions of an air operations centre deployable to remote theatres of operations (DCAOC). The EAG is active in a number of areas pertaining to deployable logistic support, including POL²² supplies, air movements and transport and GSE²³ interoperability.
72. The EACC : European Airlift Coordination Cell. Following a study on military airlift conducted by the EAG at the end of 2000, the EACC was set up in Eindhoven for the purpose of coordinating the use of member states'²⁴ airlift and air refuelling assets. A technical arrangement signed on 28 February 2001 provides the legal framework for this structure pending the drafting of a specific intergovernmental agreement, on which work has just started.
73. The EACC's work is underpinned by the ATARES technical arrangement on the exchange of air transport and air-to-air refuelling services signed on 8 February 2002. The Cell is composed of a Steering Board, which is the decision-making body, and a Working Board, whose job is to prepare and implement the instructions and decisions of the Steering Board. The Steering Board is composed of seven national delegations working under the authority of an Air Marshal. For the moment the EACC is still in the process of building up to strength.
74. Since it started operations 20 months ago, the EACC has enabled its member countries to save the equivalent of 757 C130 flight hours while strengthening existing ties between the various air transport and air-to-air refuelling planning and control bodies.
75. However, the EACC does not have responsibility for planning, which makes it difficult to fully tap its potential for coordination purposes. Indeed, the present level of coordination allows member states to choose whether or not to avail themselves of the services of the EACC or to accept its proposals. Moreover, it has no powers to intervene in the preparation of the human and material resources needed to make use of air transport capabilities (personnel training, logistic and technical support, harmonisation of equipment use). The transformation of the EACC into an EAC (European air transport centre) would remedy those two shortcomings, making it possible to optimise the current and future air transport fleets of the different countries and considerably improve Europe's force projection capability. During its meeting of 19 June 2003, the EACC Steering Board decided to set up a working group with the task of defining the ways and means of setting up an EAC on the basis of the Franco-German proposals.
76. Moreover the EACC Steering Board has clearly expressed support for the principle of enhancing the Cell's capacity for contributing to crisis-management operations. The EACC's involvement in support for Operation Artemis - the first EU-led crisis-management operation without recourse to external assets and capabilities - is to be welcomed in that respect. The Steering Board has also called for the EACC to take into account in its activities the role of the MNMCC²⁵, which is the body that is to manage transport aircraft movements towards Kabul as of August 2003 in support of ISAF IV²⁶. That contribution would be the next logical step in the process that has already started of making EACC capabilities available to NATO.
77. Finally, the enlargement of the EACC and operational cooperation with other countries, in particular during operations involving the deployment of forces over large distances, are topics that are to be studied by a special working group.
78. CSAR: Availability of Combat Search and Rescue capabilities in combat zones is essential for the effectiveness of an operation involving the deployment of forces by air. The issue of European cooperation was placed on the agenda of the EAG shortly after its creation. France and Germany are now proposing the creation of a "European CSAR Centre", with a view to developing among European armed forces a capability that they are currently lacking and that it is difficult for a single country to acquire on its own.
79. It is proposed first and foremost to set up a multinational structure to organise and coordinate CSAR activities at European level. Essentially its task would be to draw up concepts, doctrines, rules of engagement and interoperability specifications on the basis of those which exist within NATO.
80. Furthermore, member states must reach agreement on the arrangements for training personnel and on the levels of such training, as well as on organising multinational exercises for the joint practical training of the various national units. All this should make it possible to optimise the coordination of a whole range of assets capable of being used for this type of CSAR mission: specialised helicopters, commando-type troops, protection and reconnaissance aircraft, AWACs, UAVs and so on.
81. ECAP: European Capability Action Plan. ECAP was launched at the November 2001 Capability Improvement Conference and work started in February 2002. Its objective is to ensure that the EU can achieve its headline goal. A comparison between the Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue (HHC) and the Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC) setting out the contributions offered by the member states brought to light 42 capability shortfalls. This led to the setting up of 19 ECAP Panels with a remit to propose short and medium-term solutions until the EU acquires the means to implement longer-term solutions. The Panels, consisting of national experts on secondment from countries which had offered their services and led by one or more member states, reported to the EU Military Committee. Their work was validated by the Helsinki Task Force (HTF), a group of national experts meeting regularly in Brussels.
82. In 2002, a new version of the Headline Goal Catalogue was drawn up. It sets out the EU's new priorities (fighting terrorism) and corrects some inaccuracies, since some previously defined shortfalls turned out to be due merely to a problem of definition. The number of shortfalls in the new catalogue (HHC 03) is therefore lower. Against this background a new call for contributions was made which in turn led to the establishment of a new Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC 03). At the Capability Commitment Conference on 19 May 2003, the results of the 19 ECAP Panels were submitted to the Defence Ministers of the 15 EU member states. The Panels' conclusions formed part of the HHC 03 and HFC 03 analysis which led to the drafting of the Helsinki Progress Catalogue (HPC). On the basis of this new development the ECAP process has entered a new phase consisting in implementing the project options drawn up by the Panels²⁷. The 19 Panels have accordingly been replaced by 15 Project Groups, five of which are concerned solely with the following areas relating to air forces: air-to-air refuelling (AAR), combat search and rescue (CSAR), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), strategic airlift and transport helicopters. It should be noted that the possibility of setting up a "suppression of enemy air defences" group is already under study.

2. Rapidly deployable air forces and the headline goal

83. The ability of the EU member states to deploy air forces to a theatre abroad is analysed in the HFC 03 catalogue, which assesses the various proposals. It sets out the major types of capability required: headquarters and control centres, combat aircraft (interceptors and ground attack aircraft), UAVs and reconnaissance aircraft (carrying optical and electronic equipment), air-to-air refuelling, combat search and rescue, tactical lift, cruise missiles, air defence systems, theatre missile defence, deployed air base components, etc.
84. The number of Air Component Command Headquarters and Combined Air Operation Centres in Europe is sufficient. In contrast, Europe's capability to deploy such facilities is weak: only one country volunteered to be the lead nation for a deployable air command headquarters.
85. Surveillance and reconnaissance: although the number and performance of the reconnaissance aircraft proposed by the member states are acceptable, there are major shortfalls regarding UAVs, AWACs and air-to-ground surveillance systems (AGS).

(i) High-altitude long endurance (HALE) and medium-altitude long endurance (MALE) UAVs are virtually non-existent and there is no short-term solution to this problem. This is a new area in which the member states will have to cooperate in the framework of the European Capability Action Plan.

(ii) As far as AWACs are concerned, French and British offers will enable half the requirement, estimated at ten aircraft, to be met. NATO's AWACs component comprises 17 aircraft. In certain cases the EU will have access to this capability under the "Berlin plus" agreement. Furthermore, AWACs have to be fitted with air-to-air refuelling systems so as to improve the duration of their mission in a given theatre. Some EU member states have embarked on procurement programmes for aircraft equipped with Airborne Early Warning (AEW) systems, which in due course should enable them to cover practically all the specified requirements.

(iii) Europeans have virtually no air-to-ground surveillance systems (AGS). Transatlantic cooperation is being studied in the NATO framework but in view of the cost of this type of system and low European defence budgets, there is unlikely to be a rapid solution to this problem, although the ASTOR system is ready to enter service with the Royal Air Force.

86. Combat aircraft: the number of units considered necessary to meet the headline goal is slightly higher than 200; over half of them are interceptors and the remainder close air support aircraft. The member states' proposals for contributing 300 aircraft are therefore more than satisfactory.
87. Air-to-air refuelling (AAR): the HHC estimates were confirmed during recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq which brought to light the need for tanker aircraft. The EU will require a fleet of them in order to deploy 75 aircraft to a theatre of operations abroad. However, under the current proposals only half this requirement will be met. As provisional solutions in the short term the relevant ECAP project group has suggested converting C130 aircraft and hiring civilian aircraft that can be transformed into tanker aircraft using a mobile kit system. The EU member states will nevertheless have to cooperate in this area, invest in a proper multinational fleet of tanker aircraft and take the necessary steps to equip the A400M with this facility. In the medium term the procurement of the Airbus A330/200 aircraft seems the best solution.
88. Combat search and rescue (CSAR): this is an essential component which also includes an armed escort facility (combat helicopters) to protect personnel rescue helicopters. It is indispensable for the deployment of combat or tactical lift aircraft to a deployable air base. In terms of numbers the member states meet the requirements specified in the Helsinki catalogue and, on the basis of the number of current orders, there will be a big improvement in platform capabilities (helicopters) by 2009. But there are serious inadequacies in qualitative terms: doctrines, the standardisation of procedures and transmission systems on aircraft carriers and international training all need to be improved. This explains the Franco-German proposal for a "European CSAR Centre".
89. Theatre ballistic missile defence (TBMD): the proliferation of TBMD capabilities up to a range of 1000 km is a fact which has to be taken into account when deciding how to protect a deployable air base. The contributions of the member states are sufficient in number for ground-based deployable systems but the relevant ECAP panel pointed to a shortfall in deployable sea-based systems. Furthermore, arrangements for the future must be made in the framework of European cooperation particularly as regards surveillance and command and control systems, which must conform to NATO standards of interoperability.
90. Ground based air defence (GBAD): compared with the figure given in the Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue, the EU member states have offered twice the number of medium-range, airborne air defence missile batteries. There should therefore be no problem in providing GBAD.
91. Strategic lift: establishing a deployable air base calls for a significant strategic lift capability. European shortfalls in this area are well documented²⁸. The ECAP panel working on this subject made the following recommendations:

92. Tactical transport: the tactical transport capacity required on a forward airbase under the headline goal was estimated at just under 50 aircraft of the C130/Transall type. The proposals made by the member states fall slightly below that capacity, and some states are only able to offer aircraft with a much smaller capacity (of the type CASA 135 or C127). However, the A400M should plug that gap. As regards transport helicopters, the proposed contributions meet half of requirements, which are estimated at five helicopter battalions. The ECAP helicopter group has estimated that member states could allocate more assets, since they exist. It takes the view that in the medium term it will be necessary to organise cooperation in the field of helicopters by coordinating procurement programmes and setting up a joint utilisation cell, with a view in the long term to pooling existing equipment and organising joint procurements by a group of member states.
93. Components of deployed airbases: the latest Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC 03) takes stock of needs and contributions in terms of the staff needed to run the forward airbase for a remote theatre: control tower, crash intervention team, fire service, refuelling team and general support staff. The proposed contributions hardly cover half of the estimated requirements. However, since the investment costs involved are not the reason for this shortfall, it is to be hoped that several member states that have not yet offered contributions could participate if they prepared several months ahead. Nevertheless, all experts agree on the difficulties involved in organising a technical support capability for combat aircraft deployed for long periods of time at a great distance. Coordination in this field should be organised at European level within the European Air Group (EAG).
94. Suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD): the SEAD capacity of the relevant combat aircraft, which generally speaking will be used to follow up the use of cruise missiles fired from long-range naval or airborne platforms (eg. long-range bombers), depends on the use of precision-guided munitions (PGM.), scrambling systems and anti-radiation missiles. All these weapons must be available on a deployed airbase.

(i) Cruise missiles, launched by combat aircraft (Eurofighter, Tornado, Rafale etc.) will be available in sufficient numbers following the delivery of the Storm Shadow/Scalp EG missiles ordered by France, Italy and the United Kingdom;

(ii) Precision-guided munitions: Europe does not have sufficient PGM, or aircraft capable of delivering them. The modernisation programmes under way in a number of countries (Tornado, Mirage, 2000 Rafale, Eurofighter) should lead to the wider use of such laser or GPS-guided weapons;

(iii) The anti-radiation missiles²⁹ proposed are well below the 50 considered to be necessary and are somewhat obsolete from the technological standpoint. There is therefore a need for a technical study at European level of guided anti-radiation warhead systems that could be adapted for use on existing missiles.

(iv) Jamming systems: requirements are estimated at more than a dozen, but these systems are almost non-existent in Europe. A multinational programme on scrambling systems is currently under way. It involves France, Germany and Italy but is open to all interested member states.

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¹ Adopted unanimously and without amendment by the Assembly on 1 December 2003 (6^th sitting).

² Prague Summit Declaration; 21-22 November 2002; http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm

³ "High readiness levels, for example, require personnel to be fully trained, with the necessary equipment, on stand-by and ready to go quickly in the event of a crisis"; Chief of the Defence Staff, Canada, 2001-2002 annual report; page 19, chapter on "force modernisation, sustainability and the commands";

http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/00native/pdf/CDS-R_e.pdf

⁴ SEAD: suppression of enemy air defence.

⁵ ARM.

⁶ Gunship derived from the C130 Hercules aircraft.

⁷ CSAR.

⁸ This chapter is an extract from the report on "European military capabilities in the context of the fight against international terrorism", Assembly Document 1783, Rapporteur Mr Wilkinson,
http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2002/1783.html.

⁹ A gunship derived from the Hercules C130.

¹⁰ The CIA also has its own surveillance and attack UAVs.

¹¹ "US Recon Effort Top in Technology", Associated Press, 11 March 2002.

¹² In particular the AGM-86D cruise missile which can "count" the number of floors it penetrates before detonating, fuel-air explosives which suck out air and the 1 500 kg rocket-propelled AGM-130 bomb equipped with a video camera and GPS guidance system.

¹³ European Participation Air Force.

¹⁴ Search and rescue

¹⁵ Combined Air Operations Centre.

¹⁶ Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System

¹⁷ Unmanned aerial vehicle.

¹⁸ EURAC is currently composed of the Air Force Chiefs of Staff of Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom, as well as the representative of the Belgian air component.

¹⁹ http://www.defense.gouv.fr/air/doss/eurac/eurac.pdf

²⁰ Joint Force Air Component Command.

²¹ Combined Air Operations Centre.

²² Petroleum-Oil-Lubricant.

²³ Ground Support Equipment.

²⁴ Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.

²⁵ Multinational Movements Coordination Centre.

²⁶ International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

²⁷ 2509th Council Meeting - External Relations - Brussels, 19-20 May 2003; http://ue.eu.int/

²⁸ See European strategic lift capabilities - reply to the annual report of the Council, report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Wilkinson, Rapporteur, Assembly Document 1757, 5 December 2001; http://www.assemblee-ueo.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2001/1757.pdf

²⁹ ARM.